The International Handbook on Private Enforcement of Competition Law
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The International Handbook on Private Enforcement of Competition Law

Edited by Albert A. Foer and Jonathan W. Cuneo

With the international community on the brink of an explosion of private remedies for violation of national competition laws, this timely Handbook provides state-of-the-art analysis of the private enforcement of competition laws across the globe. Private enforcement of antitrust is becoming a significant component of competition policy laws worldwide; today, more than a hundred jurisdictions have adopted market regimes operating within a framework of competition law, providing a varied base for developing ways by which persons injured by anticompetitive conduct will (or will not) be able to obtain remedies.
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Chapter 12: Funding Litigation

K. Craig Wildfang and Stacey P. Slaughter


K. Craig Wildfang and Stacey P. Slaughter1 Fee arrangements in funding antitrust cases are varied. In the United States, for example, contingent fees, hourly fees, and alternative billing arrangements have all been used to finance antitrust lawsuits in private enforcement actions. This chapter focuses on the various types of fee arrangements utilized in funding antitrust and competition lawsuits in private enforcement actions. This chapter focuses on American fee models, specifically the history of contingency fees, along with a brief analysis of other fee models. This chapter also discusses the typical costs associated with antitrust litigation, which are a significant factor in funding such litigation. Cost plays a role in budget considerations for the litigation, and vary depending on the stage of the litigation. Finally, this chapter discusses some of the noteworthy damage recoveries and attorney’s fees obtained in private enforcement antitrust actions. History of funding litigation in the US through contingent fees The contingent fee system developed from the once-prohibited practice of selling speculative judgment proceeds to a disinterested party, in consideration for funding the underlying litigation.2 Commonly known as ‘champerty,’ the prohibition on such bargains between plaintiffs and disinterested third parties existed as early as thirteenth-century England when feudal lords and magnates could take advantage of 1 K. Craig Wildfang is a partner at the law firm of Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi L.L.P. Before joining the firm’s antitrust practice, Mr. Wildfang served as Special Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, United States Department of Justice in...

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