Chapter 4 outlines the doctrinal impacts of TPAF by surgically analyzing three stages of the arbitral process. Stage one is the pre-arbitrators’ decision-making. It conceptually addresses the adverse impacts of TPAF upon “disclosure” and “control” concerns. For TPAF disclosure, Chapter 4 argues for mandating disclosure of the existence and identity of the funder while providing arbitrators with the discretion to decide the scope of disclosure on a case-by-case basis. For funders’ control, Chapter 4 argues that funders’ control over arbitration may pose challenges to the rule of law that the funding arrangement is supposed to support. However, the funder’s financial stake in the claim outcome may cause the funder to interfere in the process to protect that financial interest. Contrary to the running scholarship, Chapter 4 tries to strike a balance between the funder’s interference and the party’s control. It advocates for the funder’s “tolerable control” by presenting situations where the funder’s interference can be tolerable and does not affect the validity of the funding arrangement. In general, a funder’s tolerable control assumes that the funded party retains the sole right of initiating, pursuing, and finalizing the proceedings. Stage two addresses the cognitive illusions of TPAF on the arbitrators’ decision-making process. This stage identifies the components of cognitive illusions that arbitrators may fall prey to in their decision-making. With nearly no literature on point, Chapter 4 argues that arbitrators, as human beings, may unconsciously follow the cognitive illusions that may result from the existence of TPAF. More particularly, arbitrators may fall prey to the anchoring and framing effects of the cognitive bias of TPAF. TPAF often leads to empaneling a single tribunal and adversely leads to inconsistent outcomes. The arbitration regime should respond to these cognitive illusions by controlling the stream of information on TPAF by limiting the arbitrators’ access to the funding information. Stage three focuses on the impacts of TPAF on post-arbitrators’ decision, especially the challenges of enforcing the funded awards and the interplay between the funding policy and the arbitration policy. Chapter 4 concludes that inaction must be an evidence of the need of a regulatory framework that efficiently governs the enforcement stage and serves the policies of TPAF.

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