The authors analyze the impact of governance structures on the performance of public banks by comparing an ambitious but ultimately failing Landesbank (WestLB) with a more prudent and so-far successful Landesbank (Helaba). By applying a multi-theoretical perspective, they find that the governance of these banks differed remarkably in terms of processes, which may explain the different fate of these Landesbanken to a large extent. While both banks suffered a major crisis in the 1970s, the owners of Helaba learned their lesson and set up a governance structure characterized by strict control and monitoring mechanisms. They also upheld the commitment to a public mandate. At WestLB, this commitment was dropped and the governance structure left management with a very high degree of autonomy.
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Front Matter
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PART I: Justifications for public banks
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PART II: Public banks as stability anchors: Case studies
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PART III: Public banks and development
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PART IV: Political attacks on public banks in Europe
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PART V: Keeping public banks accountable to the public
