Restricted access

The orthodox view holds that the intrusion of fiduciary standards into the banker-customer relationship is, and should be, rare. Dealings between the two are on the basis of an arm’s length commercial relationship, centred on contract, the terms of which can exclude any higher obligations. In contrast, this chapter argues that banks and financial intermediaries are subject to fiduciary obligations, or analogous standards, much more routinely than the standard approach allows for. Judicial reluctance to impose higher standards frustrates public policy initiatives favouring higher standards, not least in the wake of Global Financial Crisis. Those policy choices are often derived from international standard-setting measures, but also, as in the UK, reflect long-standing measures to enhance the conduct of business by banks and investment firms. There are welcome signs in the UK that the judicial policy of giving primacy to contractual ordering, and the ousting of fiduciary standards, is being reversed.

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

Access options

Get access to the full article by using one of the access options below.

Other access options

Redeem Token

Institutional Login

Log in with Open Athens, Shibboleth, or your institutional credentials

Login via Institutional Access

Personal login

Log in with your Elgar Online account

Login with you Elgar account
Editor: Sandra Booysen
Monograph Book