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Malcolm Torry

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Malcolm Torry

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Colin Turner

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Colin Turner

At its core, the contemporary international system is based on the existence of and interaction between a set of territorially demarcated states (Agnew 1994). Within each of these territorially bounded spaces, the state – as a collection of centralised political institutions – is sovereign. This sovereignty within this internationally agreed geographic division is presumed to be mutually exclusive (Taylor 1995). Whilst the exclusivity of state territoriality has been increasingly challenged (see below), there can be little doubting that it remains a focal point within the operation of the contemporary international system. The desire of the state to sustain and maintain its territorial pre-eminence within its bounded space requires it to develop and implement territorial strategies that enable, enforce and/or legitimise its territoriality. This is suggestive that the primary objective of these territorial strategies is to enable territoriality through enhancing the welfare of its citizens via growth, improved security, socio-economic development, territorial cohesion, etc. (Taylor 1994). This emphasises – in the absence of coercion of its citizens – the link between territoriality and the legitimacy of the state as a territorial agent. Integral to this link is the process of infrastructuring. This is defined as the act of creating and maintaining a territorial infrastructure system where infrastructure is commonly defined as ‘built networks that enable flows over space’ (Larkin 2013, p.329), offering services that, at their core, are central to territorial functioning and to the operation of the agents within that space (Finger et al. 2005).

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Edited by Nikolaos Karagiannis and John E. King

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Wil Hout and M. A.M. Salih

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Trent J. MacDonald

Much has been said about the vices and virtues of democracy. Democracy, said Benjamin Franklin, is two wolves and a sheep voting on what to have for dinner. Lord Acton warned that democracy is susceptible to a ‘tyranny of the majority’. Winston Churchill told us that democracy is actually the worst form of government . . . except for every other form that has been tried. Not without irony, he also said that the best argument against democracy is a five-minute conversation with the average voter. H. L. Mencken described democracy as the theory that people know what they want, and deserve to get it good and hard. These quotes speak to the majoritarian dimension of democracy and the reality that even in the best-of-functioning systems 49 per cent of the people can remain unhappy. To be sure, in most modern democracies even a less-than-majority popular vote can carry an election, due to the peculiarities of electoral systems.5 Democracy, in other words, is a system to ensure that some people get what they want; it is not a system to allow everyone to do so.

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Graeme A. Hodge and Carsten Greve

This chapter is situated at the nexus of two literatures: theoretical ideas from political science on the relationship between politics and markets, and the more recent public policy phenomenon of public–private partnerships (PPPs). It aims first to map some of the primary theoretical underpinnings describing the enduring relationship between governments and businesses. It then focuses on the adoption of PPPs as a popular infrastructure policy, and asks to what extent a particular political-market logic for the adoption of PPP policies appears to exist in leading jurisdictions such as the UK, Australia and Canada. It suggests that the empirical evidence on the undue influence of business over political decision making is not one sided and that the arena is still hotly contested. It also suggests that the policy logic of PPPs may be dependent on the relative maturity of governance systems, the relative maturity of PPP markets, and the political and public management environments in question. A taxonomy based on Kingdon’s conceptualization of the policy window is presented. The chapter also comments on the development of the PPP phenomenon over the last three decades and highlights particular characteristics influencing the policy path.

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Trent J. MacDonald

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Luca Zamparini and Ubaldo Villani-Lubelli

The budget has constituted one of the most debated and important issues at the political and at the academic level since the inception of the European Economic Community and in the ensuing evolution to the European Community and to the European Union (EU). The changes in its structure and composition are then crucial elements to understanding of the historical and political developments of the European Union and of its legal and economic perspectives. Given that the EU budget is mainly composed of transfers from Member States to the Union, the political negotiation always begins in the Council, where the heads of state and government define the strategic directions of the Union and set the overall amounts of the programming period. Subsequently, the European Commission presents a proposal that is first approved by the European Parliament and then by the Council of the EU. The Lisbon Treaty aimed at reinforcing the role of the EU Parliament to make the discussion more democratic. In this way, the budget would become a fruitful dialogue between European institutions, which are stakeholders of different interest groups. The financial planning would then become a fundamental open space of political confrontation, despite the expected tensions between institutions.