Awe is a positive emotion that occurs when people are in the presence of something extraordinary and beyond their typical experiences, from transformative views of majestic landscapes to the face of one’s child. Recent evidence suggests that more everyday experiences can also evoke mild feelings of awe, and that these feelings can have benefits for people’s lives. Accumulating evidence suggests that awe has several benefits for physical health, and might reduce the likelihood of developing chronic conditions. Awe also tends to prompt self-transcendence, resulting in the sense of a “small self” that shifts people’s focus towards others and the world around them. People who have experienced awe are more prosocial and helpful. They are also more creative and less likely to use stereotypes in their decision making. Over time, there is evidence that awe can improve well-being and satisfaction. Considering the grandness of the emotion of awe, it does not seem intuitive to establish a connection between awe and a relatively ordinary workplace setting. However, this chapter reviews several directions for organizations and individuals to improve their work environment and climate by fostering a sense of awe in the workplace.
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Kenneth A. Perez and Heather C. Lench
Edited by Laura Hyatt and Stuart Allen
Chapter 4 discusses the governance of markets, and more specifically the finance market and the finance industry. Using two cases, the securities market and the commodities trade market, the chapter examines how the finance industry has persistently lobbied to accomplish the de-regulation that has benefitted its interests. In the case of the expansion of the securities market, externalities in terms of predatory lending by thinly capitalized, late market entrants resulted in overbearing systemic risks, leading to the global finance industry collapse in 2008. In the case of commodities trade, to date less attended to by media and commentators, major finance industry actors are simultaneously granted the licence to both trade with commodities and issue financial instruments that enable speculation on commodities price volatility. Such licences are most likely to result in systemic risks whose cost are carried by third parties, in many cases some of the world’s poorest people suffering from soaring food prices when commodities become subject to speculation. The chapter concludes that the finance industry generates net economic welfare only when being monitored by state agencies and transnational agencies, and when its right to conduct business upstream is limited.
Chapter 1 introduces governance as a legal issue, ultimately grounded in the philosophy of right, a branch of philosophy. Early legal theorists such as Hugo Grotius sketched versions of what is today called governance, and there is today a line of demarcation drawn between liberal economies of the Anglo-American type, and continental and Scandinavian embedded economies wherein the state is recognized as a major agent influencing the economic system. The chapter discusses the differences between John Locke’s liberal view of, e.g., ownership rights, and George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s philosophy of right, developed 14 decades later. Whereas Locke emphasizes a “minimal theory” of ownership rights, serving as the foundation for liberalism, Hegel too recognizes ownership as a fundamental right but locates ownership rights within the realm of the state. Consequently, the intellectual roots of liberal economies and embedded economies share certain assumptions but also diverge regarding assumptions about the role of the state. The second half of the chapter examines the creation of the Berle–Means firm, a key legal vehicle in the liberal economy and in its governance.
Chapter 2 examines the components of the shareholder primacy governance model that has dominated corporate governance scholarship since the early 1980s. Tracing the roots of the economic theory that justifies shareholder governance to the cold war era and what has been called cold war rationality, the chapter stresses how rational choice theory has informed corporate governance through, e.g., agency theory and other economic theories stipulating instrumental rationality as a privileged analytical model. The cold war heritage has been criticized for overstating experimental data and for ignoring rational responses from experimental subjects, resulting in an overtly negative view of human decision making capacities. When transferring such analytical models to, e.g., corporate governance affairs, salaried managers, e.g., are at risk of being portrayed in unfavourable ways to justify the market for management control, in turn resulting in shareholder primacy governance. The chapter concludes that the efficiency criterion that economic theory stipulates is too one-dimensional to serve its purpose and calls for novel analytical models to better assist corporate governance activities.
Chapter 3 examines the governance of the university sector, and stresses how, e.g., the uses of “big data” and algorithms in what is referred to as algorithm governance is now commonplace to commensurate heterogeneous entities, a process integral to market making. The chapter discusses “the politics of measuring,” now pervading all spheres of social life, resulting in new metrics being constitutive of agency. Using the specific case of credit rating on the basis of so-called FICO-scores, determining degrees of creditworthiness in American society, the politics of measuring is today an ongoing and ceaseless control mechanism. The second half of the chapter examines university ranking, another case of measurement to determine the status and position of higher education institutions. The chapter concludes that contemporary university governance is riddled with problems and inconsistencies, not least the problem of handling reactivity, agents’ rent-seeking work within existing governance models.
Peter N. Stearns
A growing interest in happiness has been a crucial aspect of modern Western culture since the Enlightenment. Its evolution, alongside the emergence of new labor forms in factories and offices, suggests an obvious, though difficult, relationship and this forms the focus of the present essay on happiness and work in industrial society. Developments in the nineteenth century almost certainly reduced job satisfaction for many workers in contrast to artisanal or even rural experience. At the same time new issues––such as the relationship between what would ultimately be called personality and the work ethic, or the growing importance of measuring work by wages––took shape that have conditioned the interaction between jobs and happiness ever since. Formal interest in workplace happiness increased measurably during the first half of the twentieth century, as experts and management sought to promote greater job stability and productivity while reducing labor unrest. Several conflicting approaches emerged, complicating the assessment of actual results. Job happiness probably lagged behind the surge of interest, though some connections can be explored. Finally, at the outset of the twenty-first century, a new commitment to well-being on the job suggests a new stage in the elaboration of ideas about workplace emotion, inviting another evaluation of the relationship between actual emotional trends.
This chapter introduces the concept of governance as a key term when examining the current economic situation, including growing economic inequality. In order to understand such an economic and social phenomenon, analytical terms that bridge public companies, state-controlled agencies, and transnational regulators need to be introduced. The chapter introduces and critically discusses key terms in the governance literature, including corporate governance, transnational governance, and related terms such as accountability.