This chapter studies the effects of various forms of government decentralization on institutional quality across countries. Using corruption and the shadow economy to proxy for institutional quality, as well as three forms of government decentralization (i.e., virtual, physical, and fiscal), the econometric results show virtual decentralization to be the most effective in improving institutional quality. The effects on transition and countries in Asia are also considered.
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Peter J. Morgan and Long Q. Trinh
Sustainable and inclusive growth in emerging Asian economies requires continued high levels of public sector investment in areas such as infrastructure, education, health, and social services. These responsibilities, especially with regard to infrastructure investment, need to be devolved increasingly to the regional government level. However, growth of sources of revenue and financing for local governments has not necessarily kept pace, forcing them, in some cases, to increase borrowing or cut spending below needed levels. This chapter reviews alternative models of the relationship between central and local governments, and provides an overview and assessment of different financing mechanisms for local governments, including tax revenues, central government transfers, bank loans, and bond issuance, with a focus on the context of emerging Asian economies. The chapter also reviews financing mechanisms for local governments and mechanisms for maintaining fiscal stability and sustainability at both the central and local government levels. Based upon the evidence on the decentralization process in Asia, it proposes some policy implications for improving central–local government relations and fiscal sustainability.
Without much preparation, Indonesia, in 2000, at a stroke replaced the previous system of centralized government and development planning with a wide range of decentralization programs. The reforms gave greater authority, political power, and financial resources directly to regencies and municipalities, bypassing the provinces. The powers transferred include those of executing a wide range of responsibilities in the areas of health, primary and middle-level education, public works, environment, communication, transport, agriculture, manufacturing, and other economic sectors. At the same time, the government replaced the antiquated cash-based, single-entry system of public finance with a modern double-entry accounting system that uses a single treasury account; is performance based; and has transparent management of the public treasury, tight expenditure and financial controls with performance indicators, computerized reporting, and a tightly scheduled auditing system. On the positive side, unlike in many developing and transition countries, the decentralization program in Indonesia has not caused major political or economic problems. However, the decentralization program was ill prepared and not carried out in a logical order for two reasons. First, the capacity of subnational governments to produce public and private goods, increase productivity and employment, and promote economic growth in their jurisdictions, was not increased. Because of the long tradition of centralization, local government never built the capacity to carry out economic planning and undertake initiatives to promote local economic growth. Before the reform, the local governments had mainly functioned as implementing agencies of national policies and programs. Second, the number of good financial managers, as required by the new laws of public treasury and auditing, was also limited and needed to be trained. The rising revenues of local governments do not follow their increasing government functions to promote economic development that could potentially cause fiscal imbalances.
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Violeta Vulovic
There are many positive aspects associated with subnational borrowing, including additional funding and promoting intergenerational equity. However, it may also endanger fiscal sustainability and macro stability due to moral hazard and soft budget constraints, making borrowing controls justified and common. This chapter reviews the different types of ex ante and ex post subnational borrowing regulations used in the international experience based on a large panel of developed and developing countries. Each type of regulation has advantages and disadvantages, with varying suitability to a country’s circumstances. It is found that the presence of subnational tax autonomy contributes to an increase in the general government primary balance but not significantly for subnational primary balances. A history of subnational bailouts is associated with lower primary balances, on average, at all levels. The ‘golden rule’ and limits on debt and borrowing appear effective at all levels of government. However, none of the broad types of subnational borrowing regulations seem to have a distinct significant direct effect on the narrow definition of fiscal sustainability at the subnational level.
Qichun Zhang and Shufang Li
Fiscal decentralization has been established in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), but crises emerge at the local government level due to remaining problems of the fiscal administration system of tax allocation and the impact of replacing the business tax with a value added tax. The PRC taxation system requires readjustment and local governments have begun to focus on innovative financing models. The main path to stable and sustainable government finances is to maintain the general public budget and the government fund budget. The present chapter shows that use of innovative fundraising and financing channels will lead to the upgrading of local government infrastructure and public services. Suggestions for enhancing local government fiscal stability and sustainability include: reducing the fiscal burden at the local level by standardizing and legalizing outlay establishing a modern taxation system; establishing a standardized and predictable transfer payment system by introducing block transfer payments and prioritized transfer payments as a basis for a stable growth mechanism for general transfer payments; promoting public–private partnership legislation to encourage participation of social capital and maximize the multiplier effect of public expenditure; and improving the mid-term budget and debt-annexed budget and establishing a government planning mechanism for investment and debt financing of major infrastructure construction projects.
Fiscal decentralization and intergovernmental fiscal relations reform have become nearly ubiquitous in developing countries. Performance, however, has often been disappointing in terms of both policy formulation and outcomes. The dynamics underlying these results have been poorly researched. Available literature focuses heavily on policy and institutional design concerns framed by public finance, fiscal federalism, and public management principles. The literature tends to explain unsatisfactory outcomes largely as a result of some combination of flawed design and management of intergovernmental fiscal systems, insufficient capacity, and lack of political will. These factors are important, but there is room to broaden the analysis in at least two potentially valuable ways. First, much can be learned by more robustly examining how national and local political and bureaucratic forces shape the policy space, providing opportunities for and placing constraints on effective and sustainable reform. Second, the analysis would benefit from moving beyond design to considering how to implement reform more strategically.
Edited by Naoyuki Yoshino and Peter J. Morgan
The Political Economy of Conflict and Cooperation
Jeffrey D. Wilson
Chapter 7 examines a perplexing bilateral dispute over iron ore between China and Australia. These economies are ‘natural complements’ in the iron ore sector, with the Australian economy structurally dependent on iron ore exports and Chinese heavy industry equally reliant on low-cost Australian supplies. But despite trade growing rapidly from 2005, the China–Australia resource relationship has been marred by continuous controversy. A series of inter-firm, inter-state and state-firm disputes emerged over alleged Australian resource nationalism targeted against China, the market power of Anglo-Australian iron ore mining firms, and attempts by the Chinese government to manipulate regional markets using cartels and ‘strategic’ investments. These tensions spilled over in 2009 during the ‘Stern Hu’ espionage scandal, which saw both inter-firm and inter-governmental relations between Chinese and Australian actors almost irrevocably break down. The China–Australia iron ore war demonstrates how otherwise mutually beneficial relations between producers and consumers can be derailed by resource securitisation and the conflict and mistrust it engenders.
Towards a Capitalist Manifesto
Chapter 9 concludes the book by dispelling the myths listed in Chapter 1, and ultimately making development economics face up squarely to the realities of economic development. It summarizes the debate raised in earlier chapters regarding the function of markets and the idea of market failure as evolutionary failure. Corporations are viewed as important for economic development, as market expanders into new areas. However, markets and corporations are not enough for economic development and require economically discriminating government to ignite and sustain economic development. The chapter further discusses the role of politics, economic inequality and democracy in economic development. The chapter ends by putting into perspective the General Theory of Economic Development in contemporary economic thought, and explains why it is indeed a general theory as well as the beginning of a capitalist manifesto.
The Political Economy of Conflict and Cooperation
Jeffrey D. Wilson
Chapter 9 explores the future of resource politics of the Asia-Pacific. It begins by summarising the core findings of the study: that international resource conflicts are driven by domestic and international securitising pressures, which have been intensifying in the Asia-Pacific since the mid-2000s. It then explores how these dynamics are likely to develop in future years, particularly as the resource boom has begun to turn to ‘bust’ since 2014. While falling prices might notionally be expected to help ameliorate resource conflicts in coming years, the political-economy drivers of securitisation remain deep-rooted in the domestic politics of key regional players. While resource insecurity remains an existential problem for regional governments such as China, Japan and Korea, they will remain committed to conflictual economic nationalist policies. In many producer states, the securitisation of resources is as much to do with domestic regime security as movements in international prices, and will persist through the market downturn. For rising powers in the region – such as China and Russia – the intersection between geopolitical aspirations and resources make their future de-politicisation unlikely. Resource interdependence can be expected to contribute to conflict tendencies in the international politics of the Asia-Pacific for some years yet.