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Extraction and Power Preservation
Edited by Inge Amundsen
Edited by Inge Amundsen
Charles R. Hankla, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Raúl A. Ponce Rodríguez
The Competitiveness Challenge for Secondary Capitals
Ju-Ho Lee, Hyeok Jeong and Song Chang Hong
Over the last half century, Korea successfully escaped from poverty and socio-economic instability to achieve remarkable economic growth and democracy. An average Korean lived on 2.3 dollars per day in the 1950s; she now earns about 60 dollars per day. Since 1960, the Korean economy has maintained a 6 percent annual growth rate of real GDP per capita, becoming the 13th largest economy in the world (Maddison Project, 2013). This achievement is regarded as a historic case of sustainable growth. While several factors contributed to this outstanding growth, there is emerging consensus that Korea’s achievement of both sustained economic development and democracy is mainly due to its investment in people. At its initial stage of development, Korea faced problems similar to most other developing countries. To escape from a vicious cycle of poverty, Korea had to overcome a legacy of antiquated traditions in education and training. Koreans had traditionally neglected vocational and technical training, owing partly to Confucianism, which praises scholars of the humanities and farmers while disregards professions in manufacturing and trade. Because parents encouraged their children to pursue academic education in colleges and hold white-collar jobs, industries lagged behind with few technicians, skilled workers, and blue-collar workers. To make matters worse, Japanese colonial rule prohibited Koreans from accumulating both physical and human capital for entrepreneurship in industrial sectors. The three years of the Korean War with the division of the Korean peninsula also devastated the economic and social infrastructure and fundamentals for economic growth.
The chapter discusses the economic logic and political incentives that led to the emergence, peak, and contraction of Kulturkampf in the Catholic lands of Prussia between 1871 and 1878. It argues that Bismarck’s Kulturkampf reveals the fallacies of secularism as a series of enforced state policies: (1) De facto dominance of the religious majority over religious minorities that are in much higher need to preserve their public and social status; (2) Transformation of priests into bureaucratic experts. A game-theoretic model defining Kulturkampf as a static game between priests and the executive is proposed. The willingness of priests to accept the government’s offer and be transformed into bureaucratic experts varies. Individualist priests are easier to recruit as they care more about their personal welfare than social distribution by the Church, whereas the reverse holds for collectivist priests. Nevertheless, the success of the Kulturkampf depends on the effective recruitment of collectivist priests and their entry into formal politics in favor of the executive. The distinction between collectivism and individualism matters here, because priests can either care for the social welfare activity of the Church or their individual welfare. Secularization is not devoid of religion, as it consistently attracts more individualist rather than collectivist priests, and thus advocates a transition to more Protestant forms of government.
Ju-Ho Lee, Hyeok Jeong and Song Chang Hong
It is well-known that Korean students’ performance belongs to the top group in international competence tests such as OECD’s PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment), which have been testing fifteen-yearold students from the OECD member countries in reading, mathematics and science every three years since 2000. Recently, the OECD implemented a similar test for adults during the period from 2011 to 2012, called PIAAC (Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies), where the competence or skill levels of 16_65-year-old adults are measured in the three areas of literacy, numeracy and problem solving in technologyrich environment skills. Surprisingly, the performance of Korea’s adult population in the PIAAC test was quite disappointing. In contrast to the stellar performance of the Korean youth in PISA, Korean adults’ skill levels turned out to be slightly lower than the OECD averages. Furthermore, the gap between Korean skill level and the OECD average widens as the population gets older. We are motivated by this puzzling fact and attempt to explore the features of Korean adult skill levels from the PIAAC data. In particular, we focus on establishing empirical patterns of age–skill profile after controlling for a rich set of confounding factors rather than establishing the causal relationship. However, we will provide a benchmark study so as to infer that weak life-long learning is the key fundamental problem for the Korean education system and labor market. It would be difficult to establish a solid causal inference about the relationship between skill levels and age simply from observing that the skill level decreases in age from PIAAC. Such observation may indicate that the skill level deteriorates as people get older, which can be interpreted as a ‘depreciation’ of human capital stock with age for some reasons. However, this may also indicate that younger generations are more skilled than older generations. That is, it might indicate that there has been improvement in skill across cohorts during Korea’s development process. To distinguish between the two possible interpretations, we need to use panel data. PIAAC, however, provides a cross-sectional data at the moment so that the empirical pattern about the cross-sectional age–skill profile from PIAAC does not clearly tell us about the precise interpretation.
There are strong linkages between religion, bureaucratic organization, citizen preferences, and political regimes. The views of Lipset and Rokkan, Marx, Lukacs, Marcuse, Adorno, Weber, and Durkheim are discussed. The choice of these thinkers relates to the three grand themes that are discussed in the book: (1) The linkage between religion and political regimes in terms of social welfare expectations by the electorate, surveillance incentives, and collectivist distribution by bureaucrats; (2) The religious traditions that shape the administrative structures of local or regional communities; and (3) The different levels of policy discretion, administrative monitoring, and centralization that correspond to different sets of religious norms adopted by citizens and bureaucrats. The critique of conventional social theory treats religion in its key dimensions: as state structure, party cleavage, and social welfare.