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Chapter 7 examines a perplexing bilateral dispute over iron ore between China and Australia. These economies are ‘natural complements’ in the iron ore sector, with the Australian economy structurally dependent on iron ore exports and Chinese heavy industry equally reliant on low-cost Australian supplies. But despite trade growing rapidly from 2005, the China–Australia resource relationship has been marred by continuous controversy. A series of inter-firm, inter-state and state-firm disputes emerged over alleged Australian resource nationalism targeted against China, the market power of Anglo-Australian iron ore mining firms, and attempts by the Chinese government to manipulate regional markets using cartels and ‘strategic’ investments. These tensions spilled over in 2009 during the ‘Stern Hu’ espionage scandal, which saw both inter-firm and inter-governmental relations between Chinese and Australian actors almost irrevocably break down. The China–Australia iron ore war demonstrates how otherwise mutually beneficial relations between producers and consumers can be derailed by resource securitisation and the conflict and mistrust it engenders.

Chapter 9 explores the future of resource politics of the Asia-Pacific. It begins by summarising the core findings of the study: that international resource conflicts are driven by domestic and international securitising pressures, which have been intensifying in the Asia-Pacific since the mid-2000s. It then explores how these dynamics are likely to develop in future years, particularly as the resource boom has begun to turn to ‘bust’ since 2014. While falling prices might notionally be expected to help ameliorate resource conflicts in coming years, the political-economy drivers of securitisation remain deep-rooted in the domestic politics of key regional players. While resource insecurity remains an existential problem for regional governments such as China, Japan and Korea, they will remain committed to conflictual economic nationalist policies. In many producer states, the securitisation of resources is as much to do with domestic regime security as movements in international prices, and will persist through the market downturn. For rising powers in the region – such as China and Russia – the intersection between geopolitical aspirations and resources make their future de-politicisation unlikely. Resource interdependence can be expected to contribute to conflict tendencies in the international politics of the Asia-Pacific for some years yet.