

# Index

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- accountability 67, 150, 151, 157, 185  
Acemoglu, D. 81, 85, 88, 141, 143  
adaptation 20–21, 37, 49, 128, 171, 188,  
190–91, 197  
Africa 54, 57–8, 61, 62–9, 70–73, 76,  
78, 194  
African Development Indicators 55, 66,  
67, 68, 72  
agricultural policy 63–4  
agriculture 100, 101, 103, 127, 128–9,  
132–3, 135, 139, 143–4, 146  
Akerlof, G. 25, 178–9, 191  
Alchian, A.A. 46, 172  
Allen, G.C. 127–8  
Allen, R.C. 105–7  
altruism 21–2, 24–5, 33, 170  
Amsden, A. 59, 61, 62, 175  
animal spirits 34, 178–9  
anthropology 38–9, 122, 171, 198, 203  
anti-corruption 62, 69, 70, 71, 140, 141,  
149, 166, 167, 204  
Arbache, J. 55, 63, 65–6  
Arrow, K.J. 15–16, 17, 19, 20, 28, 31,  
33–4, 42, 172–3, 181–2, 200  
Asia (excluding Japan) 54–5, 78, 85, 97,  
98, 99–100, 120, 126  
  
Bairoch, P. 99–100  
banking sector 128, 185–6, 190, 192,  
210, 211–13  
Bardhan, P. 29, 30, 49, 50, 105, 124,  
127, 131, 136, 139, 199  
Barro, R. 8, 74, 81, 83, 89, 90  
Bates, R.H. 40–41, 50–51, 63, 173  
behavioural economics 22–6, 27, 170,  
179, 181–2, 198–202  
belief perseverance 23  
beliefs  
discontinuous institutional change  
135, 139, 145, 169, 206  
institutional change 198, 199, 201,  
203–4  
new institutionalism 41, 44  
beneficence 11, 12  
Bloom, D. 86, 88  
Bosworth, B. 74, 75–6, 78  
Botswana 125, 141–3, 144, 148, 202,  
206  
bounded rationality 19–20, 45, 171, 172,  
180, 182, 184, 188, 190–91  
brain physiology 20–21  
Britain 61, 102, 105, 132  
*see also* England  
Brown, J.M. 131, 133  
Burnside, C. 57  
  
capital 13–14, 56, 58, 64, 79, 93  
*see also* capitalist class; capitalist  
developmental state; human  
capital; physical capital; social  
capital  
capitalist class 108, 120, 127–8, 129,  
130, 132, 136, 139, 146, 195  
capitalist developmental state 60, 61, 64,  
112, 130, 140, 146, 148, 174, 175,  
204, 205  
Caselli, F. 79  
cattle ranching 141–2, 143, 144  
causation 4, 6, 71, 145, 198  
central banks 186, 210, 213  
centralized political power 100, 142  
Chakravarti, A. 57, 70–73, 200  
Chang, H.J. 19, 61, 121, 175  
China 12, 89–92, 93–5, 97–8, 99–102,  
107, 109, 120, 174, 195, 196  
Christianity 107, 108, 109, 205  
classical economics 11–14, 15, 25, 27–8,  
29, 35–6, 44–5  
classical liberal economics  
deductive methodology 6  
institutions 11–13, 14, 15, 25, 27–8,  
29, 35, 44–5, 184, 187–8, 190  
person responsibility 184  
rights 12, 38

- Clower, R. 7
- Coase, R. 40, 41–2, 47, 49–50, 51, 171
- codes of conduct 41, 45, 175
- cognitive capabilities 19–20, 170–71, 189–90
- cognitive psychology 17, 19–22, 170, 198
- Colander, D. 32, 182
- Coleman, J. 25–6, 198, 206, 207
- collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) 189, 190, 211–12, 213
- collective action
  - development strategies and performance 64, 175
  - institutional change 4, 46–7, 48, 49, 52, 53, 124, 125, 197, 201, 202–3
  - old institutionalism 37–8, 40
- collective bargaining 111–12, 113–14, 115, 118, 119, 120, 121
- see also* relative bargaining power
- Collier, P. 64–5
- Collins, S. 74, 75–6, 78
- colonial exploitation 99, 101–2, 105, 107, 132, 133–4, 153
- commercial banks 192, 213
- common law 38, 114, 116, 117
- common pool problem 166–7, 169
- Commons, J.R. 37–8, 180
- communism 93, 94, 96, 125, 148, 195, 207
- competition 12, 27–8, 46, 181
- complex systems 32, 182, 183, 184, 188, 189–90, 201
- Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) (World Bank) 69–73
- Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) (Southern Sudan) 151, 155–6, 158, 160, 161–2, 163
- conditionalities for development aid 57, 63, 65
- confiscatory powers 102, 103, 104, 105, 109, 110, 112, 113, 115, 116, 132, 194
- conflict of interest 36, 37, 39, 53, 170, 180–81, 198
- conflict resolution 37, 39, 40, 48, 120, 152, 164
- conspicuous consumption and leisure 36
- constitutions
  - China 95
  - classical liberal economics 13
  - development strategies and performance 71
  - India 134–5, 136
  - institution definition 2, 3, 4
  - Japan 129, 130
  - new institutionalism 41
  - Southern Sudan 151, 157–9, 160, 161–2
  - Western Europe 109, 113–15, 116, 119
- constrained maximization 25–6, 27
- consumption 14–15, 16, 18, 174
- contractual rights
  - development strategies and performance 62
  - economic growth 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 89, 95, 119–20, 196
  - India 105, 137
  - institutional change, effects on 124
  - new institutionalism 41, 42, 43, 173
  - Southern Sudan 161, 168
  - Western Europe 108, 109–11, 174
- cooperation 32–3, 37, 39, 40, 198
- coordination 40, 45, 47–8, 59, 62, 162, 175–6, 190, 192–3, 198
- coordination problems 19, 49, 61, 175, 180, 188, 193–4
- corporations 184–6, 188, 191
- corruption
  - development strategies and performance 67, 68, 69, 71
  - economic growth 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 93, 119
  - India 139, 140
  - Southern Sudan 165–7, 167*see also* anti-corruption
- Cosmides, L. 20–21
- costs and benefits, institutional change 46–7, 49–50
- Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) (World Bank) 66–7, 68
- Coval, J. 187, 189, 190, 210, 213
- credit 105, 109–10
- crony capitalism 60
- culture 17–18, 41, 44, 198, 201, 203–4, 205

- customs  
 economic historical evidence on  
 institutional change 108, 109,  
 113–14  
 institution definition 2, 4, 17  
 institutional change 198, 199, 204  
 marginalism 15  
 new institutionalism 41, 44, 46, 52  
 old institutionalism 37–8, 39, 48
- Darwinism/neo-Darwinism 20–21, 37,  
 207–9
- Dawkins, R. 21, 32–3
- Debreu, G. 15–16, 17, 19
- decentralized knowledge 187–8
- decentralized political power  
 China 100  
 Southern Sudan 152, 153, 154,  
 157–9  
 Western Europe 107–8, 109, 111–12,  
 114–15, 118–19, 203  
*see also* federalism; feudalism
- decision-making structures, Southern  
 Sudan 163–5
- deductive methodology 5, 6, 7
- democracy  
 classical liberal economics 13  
 development strategies and  
 performance 66–7, 68, 69, 70,  
 71  
 discontinuous institutional change  
 145, 148, 149, 204  
 Botswana 141, 142–3  
 India 134–5, 138–40  
 Japan 129–30  
 Southern Sudan 150, 151, 155–7,  
 158, 159, 160, 161, 162–3,  
 164, 166, 169  
 economic growth 81, 82, 84, 87, 88,  
 89–95, 195  
 international assistance 150–51,  
 156–7  
 United States 144
- Democracy and Governance (DG)  
 Programme 150–51, 156–7, 158,  
 160, 161, 162–3, 164, 166
- despots 101, 102, 103, 104, 106, 107,  
 109, 120, 132, 174
- developed countries 31, 54, 76, 78, 79,  
 124, 175–6, 180–92
- developing countries  
 discontinuous institutional change  
 124–5  
 economic historical evidence on  
 institutional change 99  
 government intervention 56, 58–62,  
 175, 176, 193–6, 202, 203–4  
 institutional change 123–4  
 investment rates 58, 59  
 market failure 18–19, 174, 175, 176,  
 193–4, 202  
 neoclassical economics approaches to  
 economic development 1  
 per capita GDP growth 54–5, 76–7  
 predation 30, 31, 64, 148, 194,  
 201–2, 203  
 total factor productivity contribution  
 to output growth 76, 77–8  
 X-inefficiency 79
- development aid *see* international  
 assistance/development aid;  
 structural adjustment programmes
- development strategies and performance  
 African economic performance 62–9  
 current approaches to development  
 69–73  
 development strategies 56–8  
 East Asian model 58–62, 195, 196  
 per capita GDP growth of developing  
*versus* developed countries  
 54–5
- dictatorships 30, 64, 87, 89, 91, 100,  
 119, 155–6, 194
- diminishing utility 22–3, 27
- Dinka tribe 142, 152, 165
- discontinuous biological change 207–8
- discontinuous institutional change  
 Botswana 125, 141–3, 144, 148, 202,  
 206  
 characteristics 124–5, 144–6, 147–9,  
 197–8, 202, 204–9  
 India 125, 131–40, 145, 146, 148  
 institutional transitions 124–5  
 Japan 126–31, 202  
 non-Western societies 122  
*see also* Southern Sudan: case study  
 in discontinuous institutional  
 change
- Dollar, D. 8, 57
- domestic investment 95, 165

- downward causation 4, 145, 198, 199
- Dutch institutional evolution 118–19, 120, 174
- East Asia 55, 56, 58–62, 65–6, 74, 76, 175, 189, 196, 202
- East Asian financial crisis 1997–1998 60, 189
- Easterly, W. 57, 81, 85, 88, 200, 205
- economic backwardness 100, 101–3, 105–7, 174
- economic deregulation 100, 192, 211, 212–13
- economic development 1–2, 7–8
- economic governance quality 66–7, 68, 70–71, 77
- economic growth 7–8, 42, 77, 119–21, 194–6, 201  
*see also* per capita GDP growth
- economic historical evidence on institutional change
- Asia (excluding Japan) 97, 98, 99–100, 120
- China 97, 98, 99–102, 107, 109, 120, 174
- Dutch institutional evolution 118–19, 120, 174
- English institutional evolution 105, 106, 109, 112, 114–17, 120, 174
- Islam and the Ottoman Empire 97, 98, 102–3, 107, 108, 109, 111, 174
- Mughal India 97, 98, 99–100, 104–7, 109, 132, 174
- Western Europe 51–2, 97–100, 101–2, 105, 106, 107–14, 120, 121, 123, 174, 197, 202–3
- economic history 5–6  
*see also* economic historical evidence on institutional change
- economic reform programmes 57, 63, 92–4, 136–8
- education
- development strategies and performance 69, 71
- discontinuous institutional change 128, 130, 133, 134, 135–6, 138, 146, 148
- economic growth 75–6, 82, 84, 87, 88
- institutional change 205–6
- efficiency 42, 43, 44, 45, 79, 82, 93, 175, 176, 198
- efficient markets hypothesis 1, 16–17, 19, 28, 176–80, 184, 188–9, 192
- embeddedness 3–4, 38–9, 41, 48, 180, 200
- empiricism 6–8
- endogenous view of institutional change
- classical economics 35, 36, 44–5
- economic historical evidence on institutional change in Western Europe 120, 123, 202–3
- institution definition 3
- institutional change 53
- neoclassical economics 35–6, 44–5
- new institutionalism 46–8
- endowment effect 23, 27
- enforcement
- classical liberal economics 12, 13, 29
- institutional change 200
- new institutionalism 42, 43, 45, 198
- old institutionalism 38, 39, 40, 145
- property rights 4, 13, 29, 30, 43, 204
- Engels, F. 13–14, 15
- Engermann, S.I. 143–4
- England 49, 105, 106, 109, 112, 114–17, 120, 174, 195
- entrepreneurs 56, 128, 133, 135, 175
- equality 152
- equilibrium prices 25, 26
- Evans-Pritchard, E.E. 44, 142, 149, 152, 166
- evolutionary biology 21–2, 32–3, 207
- evolutionary psychology 20–21, 170–71
- evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) 32–3
- evolutionary view of institutions 35–6, 45–8, 120, 123, 199–202
- exchange rate 59, 65, 70, 95
- executive, Southern Sudan 155, 157, 158–9, 160–61, 162–6
- exogenous view of institutional change 3, 36, 53, 124, 203–4, 205, 209
- expected utility model 22–3, 24, 27
- experimental markets 25–6, 27, 170
- exploitation 100, 101, 103, 104, 107  
*see also* colonial exploitation;  
 confiscatory powers;  
 opportunism; predation

- export-oriented industrialization 56,  
59–60
- externalities 1, 18, 40–41, 45, 50, 174–5
- factors 79
- fairness 12, 25, 27–8, 179, 200
- Fama, E. 16–17, 176, 177
- federalism  
discontinuous institutional change in  
India 134, 140  
discontinuous institutional change in  
Southern Sudan 155, 156,  
157–9, 161–2, 163, 168, 169  
market preserving federalism in  
China 93, 95, 195
- feudalism 52, 103, 106, 107–8, 112,  
126–31, 132, 135, 174, 195, 207
- financial crises 1, 60, 167, 178, 183–4,  
189, 190, 192, 210–13
- financial deregulation 192, 211, 212–13
- financial markets 1, 16–17, 176–8, 179,  
180, 183–4, 188–90, 191, 210,  
211–13
- financial products 187, 188–90, 191,  
211–13
- financial sector 128, 185–7, 188–91,  
210–13
- firms 41, 173, 175  
*see also* corporations;  
industrialization; private  
sector; state-owned enterprises
- fiscal policies 70, 94, 95
- foreign investment 66, 70, 92, 93, 94,  
95, 165
- formal institutions  
classical economics 11–12, 13, 14, 15  
economic historical evidence on  
institutional change 110–12  
*versus* informal rules 44–5  
institution definition 2  
institutional change 198–9, 200, 201,  
202  
markets in an institutional framework  
in developed countries  
180–81, 182–3, 184, 191–2  
neoclassical model 4, 17  
new institutionalism 41–4, 45, 46, 53,  
173, 175–6
- former Soviet Union countries 125,  
148–9, 201–2, 206–7
- Fortes, M. 142, 152, 166
- framing effects 23, 27
- free markets 1, 13, 18, 19, 61, 187–8,  
192, 196
- free rider problem 46–7, 51, 52
- Friedman, M. 6–7, 16, 33
- Furubotn, E. 1, 41, 42, 206
- game theory 32–3, 50, 181–2
- generalizations 5, 6
- genetic theory 21–2, 170, 198
- geographical factors, economic growth  
84, 85, 86, 88
- Glaeser, E. 86–7, 88, 205–6
- governance 4, 41, 173
- governance quality  
Botswana 141  
development strategies and  
performance 62, 66–7, 68–9,  
70–71, 72–3  
discontinuous institutional change  
140, 204  
economic development 1–2  
economic growth 80, 81, 82, 83, 84,  
85, 86, 89, 92, 93, 119  
Southern Sudan 150–51, 156–7,  
160, 161, 162–3, 164, 165
- government consumption 80, 82, 83, 86,  
90
- government debt 71–2
- government deficit 86
- government expenditure 63, 69, 70,  
71–2, 82, 117
- government failure 62, 176, 195, 196
- government finance 116, 118  
*see also* government debt;  
government deficit;  
government expenditure; taxes
- government intervention  
developing countries 56, 58–62, 175,  
176, 193–6, 202, 203–4  
discontinuous institutional change  
127–8, 135–6
- East Asia development model 58–62,  
175
- economic performance 56, 58–62,  
175, 201
- neoclassical model critique 18, 19
- Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS)  
155, 159, 160, 161, 164, 165,  
166–7, 169

- governments  
 Africa 63–4  
 classical liberal economics 12, 13  
 Government of Southern Sudan  
 (GOSS) 155, 159, 160, 161,  
 164, 165, 166–7, 169  
 historical determinism 14  
 India 134–5, 138–9, 140  
 neoclassical economics 4, 43  
 new institutionalism 43, 51, 52, 53  
 old institutionalism 38, 39  
 predation 29–30  
 Greif, A. 5, 6, 110–12  
 growth accounting studies 74, 75–80
- habits 2, 15, 17, 36, 37–8, 39, 48  
 Hall, R. 77–8, 83, 88  
 harmony 11, 12, 14, 28, 37, 39, 44–5  
 Hausman, D. 6, 7  
 Hayami, Y. 46, 49  
 Hayek, F. 2, 35, 44–5, 46, 184, 187–8,  
 190, 197  
 health care 69, 71  
 health/mortality 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 89,  
 90, 103  
 heterogeneous agents 32, 33  
 hierarchies  
 corporations 185, 186–7, 188, 191  
 institutions 3, 4, 38, 46  
 political authority 117, 135, 142, 152,  
 154, 160, 164  
 High Performing Asian Economies  
 (HPAEs) 58–9  
 historical determinism 13–14, 15, 199,  
 201  
 Hodgson, G. 2–3, 4, 19, 45, 145, 169,  
 198  
 Hoff, K. 30, 123–4  
 Holm, J. 142–3  
 honesty 38, 121, 200, 206  
 Hoover, K. 32, 182  
 human agency 11, 13, 40, 141, 144, 145,  
 148, 149, 173–4, 197–8, 209  
 human behaviour 3–4, 17, 19–26, 33–4,  
 36–8, 39, 45, 170–71  
*see also* altruism; fairness;  
 opportunism; predation;  
 rationality; reciprocal altruism;  
 self-interest  
 human capital 74, 75–6, 77–8, 80, 82,  
 83, 86, 87, 88, 90  
 human nature 11, 15–16, 19, 171,  
 199–200, 205  
 human rights/civil liberties 69, 70, 71,  
 82, 84, 88, 156, 157, 158, 159,  
 161
- ideas/ideologies  
 discontinuous institutional change 48,  
 144, 145, 146, 148, 156,  
 202–3, 205, 206  
 new institutionalism 41, 44, 53, 196  
 IMF 2, 9, 57, 69, 137, 150  
 immediate gratification 24, 25, 27  
 imperfect information  
 institutional change, effects on 124  
 market failure 18, 19, 174, 175, 193  
 markets in developed countries 180,  
 181, 182, 183, 184, 187–90,  
 191  
 markets in developing countries  
 193–4  
 neoclassical model critique 20, 28,  
 172, 173  
 new institutionalism 40–41, 45, 172,  
 173  
 import substitution industrialization 56,  
 61  
 incentives 3–4, 41, 43, 44, 124, 173–4,  
 183, 191–2, 199, 202  
*see also* perverse incentives  
 increasing returns 18, 19, 47, 50  
 independence  
 Botswana 141–2, 143  
 discontinuous institutional change  
 125, 145, 148  
 India 133, 134, 135–40, 146  
 rent-seeking 145  
 Southern Sudan 149, 153, 157, 168–9
- India  
 discontinuous institutional change  
 125, 131–40, 145, 146, 148,  
 206  
 economic and political history 92–3  
 economic growth 89–93, 97–8,  
 99–100, 196  
 economic historical evidence on  
 institutional 97, 98, 99–100,  
 104–7, 109, 132, 174  
 per capita GDP growth 131–2, 136–7  
 individual utility function 22–3, 24

- individual utility maximization 14–15, 16–17, 19–20, 21–2, 24–7, 28, 170
- inductive methodology 5–6, 7
- industrial policies 59–61, 62, 135–6
- industrialization  
 China 100  
 developing countries 175, 176, 202  
 development strategies 56  
 India 133, 135–6, 137–8, 146  
 Japan 128, 129–30  
 Western Europe 61, 108–9
- inertial forces, historical determinism 13–14, 15
- informal rules  
 classical economics 11, 12, 15  
 economic historical evidence on  
 institutional change 110, 111  
*versus* formal institutions 44–5  
 institution definition 2–3  
 institutional change 198–200, 201, 202, 206  
 markets in an institutional framework  
 in developed countries 182–3, 191–2  
 markets in an institutional framework  
 in developing countries 196  
 neoclassical model critique 4, 17–18, 28  
 new institutionalism 41, 44, 45, 46, 53, 173, 175, 198  
 old institutionalism 36, 37–8, 39, 48  
*see also* customs; reputation; social capital; social norms; tradition
- information costs 42, 173
- information theory 123–4, 209
- institutional blueprints 204
- institutional change  
 developing *versus* developed countries 122–3  
 evolutionary view 45–6, 123, 199–202  
 model 198–202  
 neoclassical economics 45–7, 49, 199, 200, 201  
 new institutionalism 46–8, 49–53, 123–4, 198  
 old institutionalism 36–7, 38, 40, 49  
 ontology of institutions 4
- institutional deficits 148, 149–50, 153–5, 186, 201–2, 206  
*see also* confiscatory powers; corruption; despots; opportunism; predation
- institutions  
 classical economics 11–14, 15, 25, 27–8, 29, 35–6  
 classical liberal economics 11–13, 14, 15, 25, 27–8, 29, 35, 44–5, 184, 187–8, 190  
 definition and concept 2–5  
 development strategies and performance 62, 66–7, 68–9, 70–73  
 economic development approaches 1–2  
 economic growth 77, 80–89, 119–21, 201  
 marginalism 14–15, 16, 35–6  
 markets in developed countries 175–6, 180–92  
 neoclassical economics 1, 2, 3–4, 15–16, 17–18, 28, 44–5, 48  
 neoclassical model critique 1, 15–16, 17–18, 28, 171  
 visible hand *versus* invisible hand 44–5  
*see also* formal institutions; government intervention; informal rules
- instrumentalist methodology 6–7
- interactive processes 36–7, 198–9, 200, 202, 205
- international assistance/development aid 56, 67, 72, 73, 149, 150–51, 154, 165, 204  
*see also* development strategies and performance; structural adjustment programmes
- international financial institutions 57–8, 62–3, 67, 69  
*see also* IMF; World Bank
- international trade 61, 66, 102, 105, 108, 109–11, 119
- investment  
 developing countries 58, 59, 65–6, 69  
 economic growth 93, 94, 95  
 neoclassical growth model 16, 56, 74, 80, 82, 90

- see also* domestic investment; foreign investment; investment banks; private investment
- investment banks 192, 213
- irrationality 34, 178, 179
- Islam 97, 98, 99–100, 102–7, 108, 109, 111
- Ito, T. 65
- Japan 61, 125, 126–31, 175, 202, 206
- Jevons, W.S. 14, 15
- joint liability 110–11
- Jones, C. 77–8, 83, 88
- Jones, E. 98–9, 101, 103, 104, 109, 112
- judgement biases 23, 27
- judiciary
  - classical liberal economics 12
  - development strategies and performance 69, 70, 71
  - discontinuous institutional change 140, 158, 159, 161
  - economic historical evidence on institutional change 110, 111, 116, 117
- old institutionalism 38
- Kahneman, D. 22–3, 25
- Kaufmann, D. 84, 85, 88, 141
- Keefer, P. 80–81, 82–3, 92, 163
- Keeley, L. 122, 171
- Keynes, J.M. 34, 172, 173, 178–9, 191
- Knack, S. 80–81, 82–3
- Kohn, M. 30, 51–2, 107, 109–10, 113–14
- Kray, A. 8, 84, 88, 141
- Kregel, J. 210, 211, 212
- labour 74, 75–6, 79, 92
- labour productivity 74, 75–8, 83, 84
- land tenure 50, 103, 104, 107, 116, 128–9, 130–31, 132, 135, 136, 143–4
- Landes, D. 98–9, 101, 102
- landlords 128–9, 132, 133, 135
- Latin America 47, 54, 55, 58, 70–73, 76, 84, 85, 143–4
- laws/rule of law
  - Botswana 141
  - classical liberal economics 12
  - development strategies and performance 67, 69, 71
  - discontinuous institutional change 205
  - economic growth 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 89, 93
  - financial sector 192, 211
  - historical determinism 14
  - India 104, 134–5, 140
  - institution definition 2, 3
  - Japan 128, 130
  - markets 194–5, 196, 201, 204
  - neoclassical model critique 4, 17
  - new institutionalism 40–41, 42, 45, 52, 175–6
  - old institutionalism 38, 39–40
  - Southern Sudan 154–5, 156, 158, 159–61, 165, 168
  - Western Europe 108, 109, 110, 112, 113, 115, 118–19
- leisure classes 29, 36
- Levine, R. 74, 81, 85, 88
- Levy-Leboyer, M. 99–100
- Liebenstein, H. 79–80
- local knowledge 204
- Lockwood, W.W. 126, 127, 129, 130
- loss aversion 22–3, 27
- Lucas, R.E. 7, 33
- macroeconomic liberalization 57, 92–3, 137–8, 195
- macroeconomic management 66–7, 68, 75
- macroeconomic policies 75, 92–3, 94, 95, 165
- macroeconomic stability/instability 59, 65–7, 68, 70
- macroeconomics 32, 33–4
- Maddison, A. 8, 54–5, 85, 97–8, 99–100, 101, 105, 107, 108, 126, 131, 132
- Magna Carta 109, 114–15, 116
- managerial power 185, 186–7
- marginalism 14–15, 16, 17, 35–6
- market failure
  - developing countries 18–19, 174, 175, 176, 193–4, 202
  - development strategies and performance 58–9, 60, 61
  - neoclassical model critique 18–19, 174–6, 184
  - new institutionalism 40–41, 45, 51



- market-oriented development strategies  
 China 93–4, 195, 196  
 discontinuous institutional change  
 145, 148  
 East Asia development model 58–62,  
 175, 196  
 economic performance 56–7, 58, 60,  
 61, 62–3, 84, 196  
 India 93, 136–8, 139, 146, 148  
 Southern Sudan 151
- market prices 2, 15, 16–17, 18, 45,  
 176–7, 188–90, 191
- market size 92
- markets  
 classical liberal economics 44–5  
 developed countries 19, 174–6,  
 180–84  
 discontinuous institutional change in  
 Japan 128  
 institutional change 201  
 institutional framework in developed  
 countries 175–6, 180–92  
 marginalism 15  
 neoclassical model 2, 15–16, 25, 27,  
 44–5, 48  
 neoclassical model critique 1, 17–18,  
 19, 25–6, 28–9, 30–31, 171,  
 174–6  
 new institutionalism 41, 42, 45,  
 173–6, 180  
 old institutionalism 38, 39–40,  
 173–4, 180–81
- Marshall, A. 2, 14, 15, 16
- Marx, K. 11, 13–14, 15, 38, 204
- Marxism 11, 13–14, 15, 35, 38, 41, 43,  
 51–2, 99, 194, 204
- Maynard Smith, J. 21, 32
- Menger, C. 2, 35–6, 44, 46
- mental models 44, 121, 173
- mercantile economies 100, 102, 105,  
 107, 108–13, 118, 120, 121
- merchant classes 101, 102, 105, 108,  
 109–12, 118, 119, 120, 127, 129
- middle classes  
 India 133–4, 135–6, 138, 139, 140,  
 146, 148, 206  
 institutional change 200, 202, 205  
 Japan 131, 206  
 Southern Sudan 168
- Middle East 55, 76
- military  
 Africa 63  
 China 101  
 India 104  
 Japan 127, 128, 129–30  
 social order 51, 123  
 Southern Sudan 153–4, 155–6, 157,  
 160–61, 163–4, 168  
 Western Europe 107, 108, 109, 110,  
 112, 118, 128
- Mill, J.S. 6, 11, 13, 15, 29
- Minsky, H. 173, 178, 191
- modernization 125, 127–8
- Montinola, G. 93–5, 163, 195
- moral hazard 185–6, 191
- mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) 187,  
 189, 190, 211–12, 213
- mortgage sector 187, 189, 190, 192,  
 210–13
- motivation 14–15, 19, 21, 24–5, 31, 36,  
 46, 52–3, 84, 171  
*see also* altruism; beliefs; customs;  
 fairness; habits; ideas/  
 ideologies; incentives;  
 opportunism; predation;  
 reciprocal altruism; self-  
 interest
- Mughal India 97, 98, 99–100, 104–7,  
 109, 132, 174
- multiple equilibria 20, 47–8, 50
- natural history 20–21, 207–8, 209
- natural liberty 11, 12, 13, 14
- natural selection 20–21, 37, 207
- Ndulu, B. 63–4, 66, 76–7
- neoclassical economics  
 critique 17–19, 53, 170–76, 177–8,  
 181–2, 184, 188–90, 192  
 rationality, opportunism and  
 predation 26–31, 170–71,  
 199, 200  
 representative agent 17, 31–3,  
 170–71
- economic development 1, 2
- efficient markets hypothesis 1,  
 16–17, 28, 176–80, 184,  
 188–9, 192
- human behaviour 3–4, 17, 19–26,  
 33–4, 170–71, 181
- institutional change 45–7, 49, 199,  
 200, 201

- institutions 1, 2, 3–4, 15–16, 17–18, 28, 44–5, 48, 171
- rational choice theory described 16–17
- research methodology 6–7
- neoclassical growth model
- cross-country regression studies 80–89
- described 56, 74, 75
- development strategies 56–7, 58, 60, 61, 62–3, 70
- growth accounting studies 74, 75–80
- Netherlands 118–19, 120, 174
- new institutionalism
- described 40–44
- institutional change 46–8, 49–53, 123–4, 145–6, 198
- markets 41, 42, 45, 173–6, 180, 182–3, 196
- neoclassical model critique 172–4
- political economy 48–53
- predation 41, 43, 53, 173, 194, 195
- non-cooperative games 181
- non-technological factors 75, 76, 77
- non-Western societies 123, 124–5, 144–5, 148–9, 197, 199, 209
- North, D. 2, 5, 19, 41, 42–3, 44, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 113, 115, 116–17, 122–3, 125, 180, 182, 194, 195, 198
- Nuer tribe 44, 142, 152, 165
- O'Connell, A. 63–4, 66, 76–7
- oil 54, 56, 65, 67, 68, 69, 165, 166–7, 168, 169
- old institutionalism 36–40, 48, 49, 51–2, 53, 66, 145, 173–4, 180–81
- Olson, M. 5, 30, 46, 47
- openness 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 92, 93
- opportunism
- institutional change 199, 201
- markets in developed countries 180, 181, 183, 184, 190, 191
- markets in developing countries 193, 195
- neoclassical model critique 28–9, 30, 31, 33, 170, 171, 184
- new institutionalism 41, 45, 53, 173
- old institutionalism 39
- principal-agent problem 185–6
- opportunism, absence of 192, 199
- Ottoman Empire 97, 98, 102–3, 107, 108, 109, 111, 174
- ownership 37, 63, 93, 131, 133, 143, 165, 185, 210
- see also* contractual rights; land tenure; landlords; property rights
- Page, J. 63, 65–6
- Pareto superior equilibrium 50–51, 124
- path dependence 46, 47–8, 209
- per capita GDP growth
- Asia (excluding Japan) 54–5, 85, 97–8, 99–100, 101–2, 126
- Botswana 141
- developed countries 54
- developing countries 54–5
- East Asia 55, 56, 58, 65–6, 74, 76
- India 131–2, 136–7
- Japan 126
- Sub-Saharan Africa 55, 65–9
- Western Europe 54, 97–8, 99–100, 101–2, 126
- per capita income 79, 80, 82, 84, 85, 86, 88, 90, 91, 97–8, 144, 193
- person responsibility/irresponsibility 184–6
- Persson, T. 81, 89, 91, 194
- perverse incentives 184–7, 190, 191, 212, 213
- physical capital 74, 75–6, 77–8
- physical infrastructure development 64, 69, 71
- Plott, C.R. 21–2, 23, 25, 27
- Poland 49
- Polanyi, K. 38–40, 180–81
- political economy 48–53
- political governance
- development strategies and performance 66–7, 68–9, 70, 71
- discontinuous institutional change 134–5, 138–40, 141
- economic growth 77, 81, 82, 84, 87, 88–95
- economic historical evidence on institutional change 112–13
- see also* despots; dictatorships; governments; political

- institutions; political leadership quality; political power
- political history 63–4
- political institutions 133, 134–5, 138–9, 146, 194–6  
*see also* democracy; laws/rule of law; separation of powers
- political leadership quality 62, 63–4, 151, 155–6, 159, 164–5, 166, 197
- political power  
 China 100, 101, 174  
 development strategies and performance 63–4  
 India 104, 105, 107, 132, 174  
 institutional change 199–200  
 Japan 127, 128, 129–30  
 markets in developing countries 194–5, 196  
 Ottoman Empire 102, 103, 174  
 Western Europe 112, 113, 114, 115, 116–17, 118, 120  
*see also* centralized political power; confiscatory powers; decentralized political power; political governance
- political reforms 93–5
- political stability 82, 83, 87
- politics 14, 39
- polity indicators 66, 67, 68, 69
- Pomeranz, K. 99
- positivism 6–7
- poverty 99, 100, 104, 106, 107, 141, 143, 144, 203
- poverty reduction 1–2, 8, 57, 63, 69–73, 167
- Poverty Reduction Strategy 2, 63, 69–73
- Power Sharing Protocol (Southern Sudan) 155, 156, 157–9
- predation  
 developing countries 30, 31, 64, 148, 194, 201–2, 203  
 economic historical evidence on institutional change 101, 104, 113, 120, 145, 174  
 institutional change 197, 199, 200, 201  
 institutional deficits 148, 149, 201–2, 207  
 markets in an institutional framework in developed countries 180, 181, 183, 184
- Marxism 43, 51–2, 194
- neoclassical model critique 29–31, 33, 170, 171
- new institutionalism 41, 43, 53, 173, 194, 195
- old institutionalism 36, 39, 51–2, 180
- predation, control of 179, 192, 199, 200
- predictability 3, 6–7, 172–3, 192
- preference reversals 23, 24
- price information 17, 176–7, 179, 183, 188, 191
- primitive societies 122–3, 152, 171, 199, 200, 201  
*see also* feudalism; tribal societies
- principal-agent problem 185–6
- private investment 58, 65–6, 69, 70, 95, 136–7, 150, 165
- private sector 63–6, 69, 70, 95, 128, 136–8, 161, 165, 167
- pro-poor government expenditure 63, 70, 71–2
- probabilities 21, 172, 173, 191
- production 13–15, 18, 40–41, 74, 75–8, 79, 83, 174–5
- productivity 74, 75, 76, 77, 84
- profit maximization 16, 185–6, 190, 211
- property rights  
 Botswana 141–2, 143, 144, 206  
 development strategies and performance 62, 69, 205  
 economic growth 80, 81, 82, 85, 89, 95, 119–20, 195, 196  
 India 105, 132, 133, 134, 135, 137, 139, 206  
 Latin America *versus* US 143–4  
 legal enforcement 4, 13, 29, 30, 43, 204  
 markets 195, 196, 204  
 new institutionalism 40–41, 42, 43, 46, 50, 51, 173  
 Ottoman Empire 102, 103  
 Southern Sudan 158, 161, 168  
 Western Europe 108, 109, 112, 113, 114, 115, 174
- public goods 1, 18, 24–5, 40–41, 45, 174
- public sector 56, 60, 66–7, 71, 136
- quantity theory of money 33–4
- Rabin, M. 23, 24–5, 27

- rational expectations 172–3, 176–80
- rationality  
 classical liberal economics 13  
 evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) 32–3  
 marginalism 15  
 neoclassical model 179, 199, 200, 201  
 neoclassical model critique 17, 19–21, 22, 27, 170–71  
 new institutionalism 40, 41  
 rational choice theory 16–17  
 social change 205
- reciprocal altruism 21, 24–5, 170
- reconstitutive downward causation 4, 145, 198
- reference levels, neoclassical model critique 22–3
- regulations  
 classical liberal economics 13  
 development strategies and performance 69  
 discontinuous institutional change in Southern Sudan 165  
 economic performance 56  
 markets 18, 19, 201  
 new institutionalism 41, 45, 175–6  
 old institutionalism 39  
 private sector in Africa 63–4
- relations of production 13–14
- relative bargaining power 46, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 121, 124
- relative preference changes 46, 47
- relative price changes 46, 47, 49, 50
- religion 4, 39, 41, 199, 205  
*see also* Christianity; Islam
- rent-seeking  
 classical liberal economics 197  
 institutional change 123, 124, 145  
 institutional decay 148, 149  
 Latin America 144  
 new institutionalism 41, 53, 174, 194, 195
- representative agent 17, 31–3, 170–71
- representative assemblies 113–14, 118, 120, 134, 138, 139, 141, 142–3, 161–2, 163
- reputation 38, 110, 211
- research methodology 5–8
- Richter, R. 1, 41, 42, 206
- rights 12, 38, 52, 112–13, 117  
*see also* contractual rights; human rights/civil liberties; property rights
- risk  
 economic growth 80–81, 82–3, 85, 86–7, 119  
 entrepreneurship 175  
 neoclassical model critique 22–3, 172, 188–90  
 perverse incentives 185–6, 187, 212, 213
- risk assessment 188–90, 191, 192, 212
- Robinson, J. 64, 81, 85, 88, 141
- Rodrik, D. 60, 61–2, 84, 88, 89, 90, 91, 176, 204
- Rudolph, L.I. 139–40
- Rudolph, S.H. 139–40
- rule of law *see* laws/rule of law
- ruling elites  
 Africa 63–4, 194  
 Botswana 141–3, 144, 148, 206  
 China 100–101, 120  
 development strategies and performance 62  
 discontinuous institutional change 145, 146, 148, 149, 197  
 historical determinism 14  
 India 104, 107, 132, 135, 138–9, 148, 206.  
 institutional change 51, 52, 53, 123, 125, 199–200, 202–3  
 Japan 127, 128, 129–30, 206  
 old institutionalism 36  
 Ottoman Empire 102, 103  
 predation 29–30, 31, 194, 195  
 Southern Sudan 150  
 Western Europe 107, 109, 114, 120
- Russia 207
- Ruttan, V. 46, 49
- Sachs, J. 57, 81, 83, 86, 88
- savings 58, 59–60, 65–6, 69
- scientific innovation 99, 102
- Searle, J.R. 3
- security 11, 12, 13
- self-commitment and control 24
- self-enforcement 113, 114, 115, 117, 120, 123, 145, 146, 168, 194–5, 198, 200, 206

- self-interest  
 classical liberal economics 11, 25, 27–8, 44  
 evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) 32–3  
 marginalism 15, 35  
 neoclassical model 16, 19, 44, 46, 47, 181, 199, 200, 201  
 neoclassical model critique 17, 20, 21–2, 24–5, 26–31, 32–3, 53, 170
- self-regulation  
 markets 1, 27–8, 29, 39, 44–5, 180–81, 182, 184, 190, 192, 209  
 natural history 208
- senior managers' remuneration 185–6, 187, 213
- separation of powers  
 classical liberal economics 12  
 development strategies and performance 71  
 discontinuous institutional change 135, 139, 151, 156, 157, 158, 159, 168  
 economic growth 84, 86, 87, 89, 194–5  
 economic historical evidence on institutional change 113, 117
- Shen, T.Y. 79
- Shiller, R. 177–9, 191
- Simon, H. 19–20, 41, 171
- Singapore 59–60
- Smith, A. 11–12, 14, 15, 25, 27–8, 31, 44, 197, 200
- Smith, V. 26, 27
- social backwardness 101, 102, 103
- social capital 52, 196, 198, 199, 200, 201, 203, 206, 207
- social change 14, 125, 140, 199, 204–6
- social institutions 40–41, 45
- social norms 41, 110, 198, 206
- social order 37, 39, 44, 51, 122–3, 176, 198
- social relations 3, 17–18, 39, 45
- Sokoloff, K.L. 143–4
- Solow, R. 74, 75
- Southern Sudan: case study in discontinuous institutional change  
 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 151, 155–6, 158, 160, 161–2, 163  
 constitution 151, 155, 157–9, 160, 161–2  
 Democracy and Governance Programme 150–51, 156–7, 158, 160, 161, 162–3, 164, 166  
 executive 155, 157, 158–9, 160–61, 162–7  
 federalism 155, 156, 157–9, 161–2, 169  
 institutional development 2005–2009 167–9  
 institutions during the civil war 149–50, 153–5  
 legal framework 161  
 legislature 155, 158, 159–61  
 traditional society 149, 152–3  
 standard of living 8, 106  
*see also* per capita GDP growth; per capita income; poverty; wages; wealth
- state *see* governments
- state-owned enterprises 60, 92, 93, 94, 128, 135, 137
- Stein, H. 59–60, 61
- Stiglitz, J.E. 1, 19, 30, 60, 123–4, 174–5
- stock prices 16–17, 177–8, 179
- structural adjustment programmes 57–8, 63, 65, 69
- sub-prime mortgage crisis 1, 178, 183–4, 187, 189, 190, 192, 210–13
- Sub-Saharan Africa 55, 64–9, 76–7, 90, 148, 149, 201–2, 206
- Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) 151, 154–6, 157, 158, 159, 160, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 168
- Summers, L. 179
- survival 21, 106, 171, 199
- Tabellini, G. 81, 89, 91, 194
- tariff barriers 56, 59, 61
- taxes  
 Africa 63  
 China 94, 95, 100, 101  
 classical liberal economics 13  
 development strategies and performance 59–60  
 India 104, 136

- Japan 128  
 new institutionalism 43  
 Southern Sudan 155, 159, 162, 165  
 Western Europe 108, 109, 110, 112,  
 113–14, 115, 116, 117, 118  
 technological backwardness 101, 102–3,  
 107  
 technological innovation 75, 78, 100,  
 102, 120, 202–3  
 Thaler, R. 13, 23, 25  
 theorization 6–7  
 time consistency/inconsistency 23, 24,  
 27  
 Tooby, J. 20–21  
 total factor productivity 75, 76, 77–8  
 trade liberalization 57, 61, 70, 84, 86  
 trade protectionism 56, 59, 61, 112  
 tradition 2, 4, 135, 139, 149, 152–3,  
 166–7, 169, 205  
 transaction costs  
 Africa 63  
 institutional change, effects on 124  
 markets in an institutional framework  
 in developed countries 180,  
 181, 182, 183  
 markets in developing countries 193  
 new institutionalism 41–3, 44, 45, 47,  
 49–50  
 transactions 37  
 transparency 69, 70, 71, 156, 157, 166,  
 189, 192  
 tribal societies 142–3, 149, 150, 152,  
 154, 158, 160, 164, 169, 206  
*see also* Dinka tribe; Nuer tribe;  
 Tswana tribe  
 trust 28, 45, 175, 179, 182, 183, 198,  
 200, 206  
 Tswana tribe 141–3, 144  
 Tversky, A. 22–3, 24  
 uncertainty  
 markets in an institutional framework  
 in developed countries 181,  
 182, 183, 188, 189, 191  
 neoclassical model critique 18, 20,  
 28, 172, 173, 178  
 new institutionalism 41, 42  
 United Nations 149, 150, 156, 158, 163  
 United States 1, 54, 61, 76, 77–8, 85,  
 143, 144, 177, 178, 182, 183–4,  
 186–7, 189, 190, 191, 192,  
 210–13  
 upward causation 4, 199  
 urbanization 64, 85  
 USAID's (United States Agency for  
 International Development's) DG  
 Programme 150–51, 156–7, 158,  
 160, 161, 162–3, 164, 166  
 validity, research methodology 5, 6, 7  
 Van Eeghen, P.-H. 184–5, 186  
 Veblen, T. 29, 36–7, 38, 145, 180  
 violence 51–2, 122–3, 198, 202–3  
 Wade, R. 59, 61, 175  
 wages 105–6  
 Wallis, J.J. 42–3, 51, 122–3, 182  
 Walras, L. 14–15, 17, 27, 188  
 wars/civil wars  
 China 101, 102  
 discontinuous institutional change  
 127, 148–9  
 India 104, 106  
 institutional change, effects on 52,  
 122, 123, 198  
 Japan 127  
 Southern Sudan 149–50, 153–5, 168  
 Western Europe 108, 109, 114, 115,  
 117, 118, 119  
 wealth  
 Africa 63, 142, 144, 152  
 classical liberal economics 11, 13, 29  
 India 104, 132  
 Japan 127  
 Marxism 35, 43  
 neoclassical model 16, 19, 21, 22,  
 170  
 new institutionalism 40, 49  
 Western Europe 99–100, 107, 108,  
 113, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120  
 Weber, M. 13, 204–5  
 Weingast, B.R. 51, 93, 113, 115, 116–17,  
 122–3, 163, 194, 195  
 Western Europe 51–2, 54, 97–100,  
 101–2, 105, 106, 107–14, 120,  
 121, 123, 126, 174, 197, 202–3  
 Western societies 128, 130, 135, 139,  
 151, 155–6, 165, 202, 205  
 Williamson, O.E. 3–4, 28–9, 30, 31, 35,  
 41, 185, 188

- World Bank 2, 56–7, 58–60, 62–3, 65,  
66–73, 92, 95, 150, 156, 163, 166
- world financial crisis and recession  
2007–2010 1, 7, 178, 180, 186,  
190, 191, 213
- X-inefficiency 79–80
- zero transaction costs 42, 47, 49–50

