Index

adjustment problem 32
age-related spending 138–9
ageing populations 72
Agenda 2010 86
Albo, Gregory 66
Alesina, A. 120
Allocation Unique Dégressive (AUD) 80
Allsopp, C. 10, 48, 103
Andersen, Jorgen Goul 78
Andrews, D.M. 18–19, 22, 48
Annett, A. 10, 103
Arrighi, Giovanni 77
Artis, M.J. 10, 27, 48, 49, 103, 124, 180, 182, 187
Atkinson review 161–2
AUD (Allocation Unique Dégressive) 80
Austria
  MTO for sufficiently diminishing debt 184–5
  political parties 76
  safety margins with respect to 3 per cent of GDP 182
  vote against SGP suspension for Germany and France 93
  wage growth 117–18
Balassone, F. 10, 103, 144
Ball, L. 165
Barro, R. 30, 164
Bartsch, Elga 98
Baun, M.J. 48
Bayoumi, T. 175
BDI (Confederation of German Industry) 119
Becker, Uwe 69
Beetsma, R.M.W.J. 113
Begg, I. 10, 103
Belgium
  early interest in EMU 19
  MTO for sufficiently diminishing debt 183–5
public investment levels 144
  safety margins with respect to 3 per cent of GDP 182
Belo, F. 48
Berg, A. 39
Berlusconi, Silvio 100
Bernard, W. 5, 15, 33
Bhundia, A. 135
Bibow, J. 124
Bieling, Hans-Jurgen 64, 68, 73
Bini-Smaghi, L. 171
Blanchard, O. 144, 164, 175
Blinder, A.S. 163
Bordo, Michael D. 48, 49
Boyer, Robert 73, 74, 78, 79, 92
Braun, D. 114
Broadbent, Ben 95–6
Brook, A.-M. 163
Buchele, Robert 78
Buitier, W.H. 29, 163, 164, 165, 172
Burns, A. 48
Buti, M. 10, 103, 113, 149, 172, 180, 182, 187
Cafruny, Alan 78
Calmfors, L. 124, 165
Canada, economic stability 130
Canova, F. 186
Carlin, Wendy 48, 119
Chinn, M. 163
Chirac, Jacques 89–90
Christensen, T. 4, 90
Christiano, L. 186
Christiansen, Jens 78
Ciampi, Carlos Azeglio 101
Clayton, Richard 73
Clift, Ben 62, 75
CMU (Couverture Maladie Universelle) 80
Code for Fiscal Stability (UK) 132, 135
Codogno, L. 103

195
competitive austerity 66
competitive corporatism 92
consensus, measures of 16
constrained discretion 8, 129, 131, 141
constructivists see identity oriented constructivists
Conway, P. 163
Couverture Maladie Universelle (CMU) 80
credibility
economist approaches 25–32
effective macroeconomic frameworks 133
of Euro 14, 86
importance of 2, 14
overview 43, 48
political economy based analytical framework 32–6
political science approaches 16–25
SGP (Stability and Growth Pact) 137–40
structural definition 25
see also integrated political economy model of credibility
credibility of British and Italian commitment to exchange rate stability, study
consensus data 39–40
definitions 37–9
overview 36–7
results 40–43
crises, definition 37–9
Crouch, Colin 69, 86, 90, 91–2, 102, 120
Cukierman, A. 116
Czech Republic, excessive deficit 159, 165
Deubner, Christian 70
DGB (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund) 113, 118, 119–20
Dini law 101
divorce rates 72
domestic politics perspective 3–4
Dornbusch, R. 103
Driffil, J. 124
Dumenil, Gerard 78
Dunford, Mick 70
Dyson, K. 3, 23, 48, 63, 89, 92, 102, 109
early policy advice 149
Easterly, W. 164
Ebbinghaus, M. 116
ECB (European Central Bank)
arguments for 17–18
and German wage restraint 117–19
policies 63–4
restricted flexibility 66–7
ECB centric Euro-zone 23
economic cycles, and SGP 140–41
economic ideas oriented constructivists 3, 22–3
effective macroeconomic frameworks
credibility 133
flexibility 133
legitimacy 133–4
overview 130–31
policy coordination 134
transparency 133–4
Eichel, Hans 20, 66, 92, 93, 98
Eichengreen, B. 2, 16, 32, 37–8, 50, 175
Eijffinger, S.C.W. 4, 10, 91, 103
EMU (Economic and Monetary Union)
as attempt to implement US-style finance 68
combining domestic and international explanations 21–2
future 191–3
incompatibility with EU solidarity 76–7
intergovernmentalist view 18–21
neo-constructivist explanations 22–3
neo-functionalist view 17–18
and politics of mediation 74–6

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>197</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>as self-limiting</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Washington/Wall Street</td>
<td>61–4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and welfare state retrenchment</td>
<td>71–4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engelmann, D.</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engle, R.F.</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epifani, Guglielmo</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERM (Exchange Rate Mechanism)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERW (Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz) speculative pressure index</td>
<td>37–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esping-Andersen, Gosta</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU (European Union) budget</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>diversity challenge for SGP</td>
<td>156–9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>employment policies</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stagnation and low employment</td>
<td>64–70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>success of</td>
<td>60–61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Statistical System</td>
<td>148–9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Statistics Code of Practice</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evans, P.B.</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatás, A.</td>
<td>112, 113, 175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favero, C.A.</td>
<td>175, 178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Featherstone, K.</td>
<td>4, 89, 109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland balancing flexibility and welfare state provision</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTO for sufficiently diminishing debt</td>
<td>184–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>productivity rates</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>safety margins with respect to 3 per cent of GDP</td>
<td>181–2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vote against SGP suspension for Germany and France</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fiscal coordination</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fiscal federalism</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fiscal harmonization</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fiscal policy literature</td>
<td>174–6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fiscal stabilization</td>
<td>159–61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>flexibility, effective macroeconomic frameworks</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flood, R.P.</td>
<td>28, 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Franc fort’ policy</td>
<td>20, 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France domestic politics surrounding suspension of EDP</td>
<td>89, 99–100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economic stability</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in EMU negotiations</td>
<td>18, 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exports to US</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTO for sufficiently diminishing debt</td>
<td>183–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>politics</td>
<td>74–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>safety margins with respect to 3 per cent of GDP</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franco, D.</td>
<td>10, 103, 144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankel, J.</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franzese, R.J.</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fratianni, M.</td>
<td>27, 49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freyssenet, Michel</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frieden, J.</td>
<td>3, 24, 32, 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSAP (Financial Services Action Plan), as attempt to implement US-style finance</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>functional spillover</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>functionalist view see EMU (Economic and Monetary Union), neo-functionalist view</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gali, J.</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ganssman, Heiner</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garber, P.</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garcia, S.</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garratt, A.</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garret, G.</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German malaise</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany Agenda 2010</td>
<td>87, 98–9, 102, 111, 120, 123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>breaches prior to SGP demise</td>
<td>97–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>domestic politics surrounding suspension of EDP</td>
<td>89–90, 98–9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economic stability</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in EMU negotiations</td>
<td>18–20, 62–3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exports to US</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fiscal misbehaviour visibility</td>
<td>110–11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fiscal performance</td>
<td>111–12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>managed capitalism</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTO for sufficiently diminishing debt</td>
<td>183–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>politics</td>
<td>75–6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pro-cyclical behaviour</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>re-unification</td>
<td>18–19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>safety margins with respect to 3 per cent of GDP</td>
<td>181–2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGP breach</td>
<td>109–10, 122–3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wage compression</td>
<td>114–16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
wage demands/fiscal compensations 119–22
wage restraint under EMU 117–19
wage–monetary coordination before EMU 116–17
Giavazzi, F. 31, 144, 164
Giersch, H. 116
Gill, Stephen 33, 63, 86
Gindin, Sam 77
Giovannini, A. 31
Giudice, G. 172
Glynn, Andrew 78
golden rule 172
Goldstein, M. 50
Gordon, David B. 30
Gordon, Robert J. 78
government bonds, homogeneity across Euro area 136–7
Grafe, C. 164, 165, 172
Grahl, John 62, 79
Greece
   MTO for sufficiently diminishing debt 183–5
   safety margins with respect to 3 per cent of GDP 181–2
   statistics revision 148
Gretschmann, Klaus 92
Gros, D. 1, 2
Gruen, N. 165
Grüner, H.P. 119
Haas, E.B. 17
Hagen, J. von 113, 124, 170
Hall, P.A. 111, 116, 117
Hallett, A. 48
Hancké, B. 124, 125
Hartnett, Michael 96
Harvey, David 67
Haseler, Stephen 77
Hausler, Jurgen 80
Hein, E. 113
Heipertz, M. 4, 10, 88, 89, 90, 103
Helbling, T. 48
Hemerijck, A. 60, 69
Hirsch, Joachim 80
Hodson, D. 148
Holman, Otto 78
Holmes, M. 48
Howarth, D. 92
Hungary
excessive deficit 159
transitional costs 157
identity oriented constructivists 3, 22–3
indebted innovation 77
integrated political economy model of credibility
need for 14–15
intergovernmentalist view, EMU (Economic and Monetary Union) 18–21
investment flexibility, SGP 141–4
Ireland
   MTO for sufficiently diminishing debt 184–5
   public investment levels 144
   safety margins with respect to 3 per cent of GDP 182
Issing, Otmar 78
Italy
   domestic politics surrounding suspension of EDP 100–101
   early interest in EMU 19
   economic stability 130
   excessive deficit procedure 145–6
   exports to US 97
   Lira’s departure from ERM 27
   MTO for sufficiently diminishing debt 184–5
   political parties 76
   public investment levels 144
   safety margins with respect to 3 per cent of GDP 182
see also credibility of British and Italian commitment to exchange rate stability, study
Iversen, T. 111, 117, 124
Japan, economic stability 130
Jar, R.J. Franzese 111, 117
Kaminsky, G.L. 39
Katzenstein, P.J. 115
KGF (Krugman–Flood–Garber) models 28–9
King, G. 41, 51
Kirsanova, T. 159
Kohl, Helmut 75
Koo, J. 48
Index

Korpi, Walter 73, 80
Kose, M. 48
Krugman, P. 26, 28, 35
Krugman–Flood–Garber (KGF) models 28–9
Kupchan, Charles 77
Kydland, F.E. 30

labour market policy 68–9
Lafontaine, Oskar 20
Lamartina, S. 175
Lankowski, Carl 62
Latvia, public investment 158
Leblang, D.A. 5, 15, 33, 50
Leblond, P. 103, 104, 105
legitimacy effective macroeconomic frameworks 133–4
SGP (Stability and Growth Pact) 147–53
Leonard, Mark 77
Levy, Dominique 78
liberal intergovernmentalism 19
Lindberg, H. 49
Lindberg, L.N. 17
Lionel Jospin 75
Lipietz, Alain 63, 69, 79, 80
Lipset, Seymour-Martin 76
Lisbon Process, as attempt to implement US-style finance 68
Loriaux, Michael 62

Maastricht Treaty, EMU protocols 1
Mabbett, Deborah 66, 80
MacDonald, Ronald 49
macroeconomic frameworks see effective macroeconomic frameworks
Maher, I. 148
Mahon, Rianne 65
Major, J. 49
Malta, excessive deficit 159
managed capitalism, for Germany 92
Marion, N. 31
Marsden, D. 92
Marshall, T.H. 80
Martin, L.L. 4, 22, 89
Marzinotto, B. 104, 119
McDougall, D. 79

McDougall Report (1977) 67
McKay, D. 4, 90–91, 111
McNamara, K.R. 3, 23, 89
Métilz, J. 164
Merkel, Angela 99, 102
Middlemas, K. 48
Mihov, I. 112, 113, 175
Mills, T. 48
minimum fiscal effort 139, 152
Minkkinen, P. 3
Mitchell, W. 48
Mitterrand, François 75, 92
Monacelli, T. 175, 178
Moravcsik, A. 3, 6, 19–21, 48, 49, 85, 86, 91
Mortensen, L. 164
MPC (Monetary Policy Committee) 135
MTO (Medium Term Objectives) differentiated among member states 9, 79, 144
model impact of EMU introduction on data 178–9
overview 176–7
variables 177–8
objectives 172–3
overview 170–71, 185–6
reforms 138, 146, 149, 173–4
safety margins of sufficiently diminishing debt 182–5
safety margins with respect to 3 per cent of GDP 180–82
Muller, Werner 92
Munchau, Wolfgang 79, 80
Mundell, R. 48
Muscatelli, V.A. 31

n–1 problem 32
National Audit Office 132, 162
neo-constructivist perspectives 3
neo-corporatism 92
neo-functionalist view, EMU (Economic and Monetary Union) 17–18
Netherlands MTO for sufficiently diminishing debt 184–5
Polder model 69
political parties 76
safety margins with respect to 3 per cent of GDP 182
vote against SGP suspension for Germany and France 93
Nickell, Stephen 78
Noord, P. van den 174
Oberreuter, Heinrich 99
Obstfeld, M. 28, 30, 31, 50
OCA (optimal currency area), Eurozone as 18
O'Donnell, G. 135
O'Donovan, B. 163
Olney, Karen 96
ORF (other relevant factors) 146, 148, 151–2
Orr, A. 163
Ozkan, G. 50
Padoa-Schioppa, T. 17, 48
Palier, Bruno 75, 80
Pannitch, Leo 77
Pappa, E. 186
Patillo, C. 39
pension reform 68
Perez, P.J. 48
Perotti, R. 174, 175
Petit, Pascal 78
Pezzotta, Savino 101
Pihl, Fredrik 65
Pisani-Ferry, J. 109, 164
Pizzorno, A. 120
Pochet, P. 92
Poland
excessive deficit 159
transitional costs 157
Polder Model 69
policy coordination, effective
macroeconomic frameworks 134
political economy analysis, of credibility 25, 33–4
political spillover 17
politics of mediation, and EMU 74–6
Pontusson, Jonas 73
Portugal
excessive deficit procedure 145–6
MTO for sufficiently diminishing debt 183–5
safety margins with respect to 3 per cent of GDP 182
welfare state 71
post-industrial dilemma thesis 65, 70
Potomaki, H. 3
Prescott, C.E. 30
Prodi, Romano 66, 93, 101
public investment levels, new EU states 158
purely economic analysis, of credibility 25, 34
purely political analysis, of credibility 25, 34
Putnam, Robert 21
Quah, D. 175
Quinlan, J.P. 78
Rae, D. 163
Raffarin, Jean-Pierre 100
Ramsie, Harvie 79
realignment expectations 25–6
Reid, T.R. 77
Reinhart, C.M. 39
Revenu Minimum d'Insertion (RMI) 80
Rhodes, M. 4, 60, 71, 72, 92
Richter, C. 48
Riester, Walter 92
Rifkin, Jeremy 77
Risse, T. 3, 22–3
RMI (Revenu Minimum d'Insertion) 80
Rogoff, K. 31
Rokkan, Stein 76
Rose, A.K. 26, 27, 37–8, 48, 49
Ryner, Magnus 66, 69, 74, 80
Sandholtz, W. 4, 17, 22, 89
Sapir, A. 113
Sargent, Thomas J. 172
Sassen, Saskia 68
Scharpf, Fritz 69
Scheingold, S.A. 17
Schelkle, Waltraud 10, 66, 80, 103
Schmidt, Josef 74
Schmidt, J.U. 116
Schröder, Gerhard 66, 76, 89–90, 92, 98–9, 102
Schulten, Thorsten 64, 73
Schumacher, D. 136
Seabrooke, Leonard 61, 62, 63
Seeleib-Kaiser, Martin 80
Seidman, L. 165
severe economic downturn 9, 144, 150–51
SGP (Stability and Growth Pact)
complementary national frameworks 153–4
credibility 137–40
and credibility of Euro 14
declared ‘stupid’ by Prodi 66
definitions 1–2
EU diversity 156–9
flexibility 140–47
as forcing pro-cyclical action 110, 112–14
future 191–3
future implementation challenges 153–62
history 171–2
identification as downside risk by OECD 65
legitimacy 147–53
macroeconomic stability 159–61
national ownership 153–4
rationale 135–7
reforms 109, 135, 149–53, 162–3, 191
structural reforms 154–6
suggested abandonment by Eichel 66
SGP (Stability and Growth Pact) demise
death/demise terminology 2
domestic politics alternative account 101–103
domestic politics interpretation 89–93, 98–101
embedded intergovernmentalism analysis
overview 85–8
political economy level 86
purely economic level 86
purely political level 86–7
market reaction 94–8
political positions 93–4
Sibert, A. 163
Siegel, Nico 80
Slovakia, excessive deficit 159
social dumping 71
Soskice, D. 48, 111, 116, 117, 124, 125
Spain
MTO for sufficiently diminishing debt 183–5
safety margins with respect to 3 percent of GDP 182
vote against SGP suspension for Germany and France 93
special circumstances
Italy 145–6
new EU states 159
Portugal 145–6
speculative attack models
KGF (Krugman–Flood–Garber) 28–9
second generation 28, 30–32
speculative attacks 16
speculative pressure index 16
spillover 17
Stark, J. 109
Stock, J. 48
Story, Jonathan 63
Streeck, W. 70, 91, 117, 120, 125
Structural Vector Autoregression Model (SVAR) 175
surveillance, challenges of 161–2
Sutherland, A. 50
SVAR (Structural Vector Autoregression Model) 175
Svensson, E.O. 26, 27, 49
Svensson, L. 26, 49
Sweden 65, 69
Talani, L.S. 7, 10, 16, 21, 24, 48, 78, 85, 86, 90, 91, 192, 193
target zone theory 26
Thygesen, N. 1, 2
Tidow, Stephan 64
time-inconsistency problem 131
Toigo, P. 164
Torfing, Jacob 69
Trampusch, Christine 70
transparency
challenges of 161–2
effective macroeconomic frameworks 133–4
Tremonti, Giulio 93
Trichet, Jean-Claude 93
trilemma of monetary policy 17
Truger, A. 113
Tsoukalas, L. 10, 48
UK
- economic stability 130
- in EMU negotiations 21
- fiscal framework 131–2, 142–3
- fiscal and monetary policy coordination 134–5
- monetary independence 18
- Pound's departure from ERM 27–8
- see also credibility of British and Italian commitment to exchange rate stability, study

Unger, Roberto M. 80

US, economic stability 130

US dollar, rise of 61–2

Vahid, F. 48

van Kersbergen, Kees 74

VARs (vector autoregression models) 175–6

vector autoregression models (VARs) 175–6

Verdelhan, A. 175

Verdun, A. 4, 10, 88–90, 103

Visser, Jelle 69

Waigel, T. 164

Wallace, Neil 172

Wallerstein, Immanuel 77

Walter, Ingo 63

Watson, M. 48, 80

Weale, A. 4, 90

welfare states, and EMU 71–4

Werner Plan (1969) 1

Wolswijk, G. 124

Woods, R. 164, 165

Wooley, J.T. 22

Wren-Lewis, S. 103, 165

Wynne, M. 48

Wyplosz, C. 2, 10, 37–8, 103, 165

Young, R. 4, 89

Zalm, Gerrit 93–4

Zhang, W. 48

Zheng, L. 41, 51