

Index

- Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) 175
abortion 190
Acemoglu, D. 92, 196, 236, 237
Adamic, L. 222
Adena, M. 23
agent-based modeling 76
Aghion, P. 64–8
Agrawal, A. 209
agricultural organization
 challenges of 205–11
 growth and climate 205–11
 information technology and climate change
 208–9
 methodology issues 209–10
 motivation 205–6
agriculture 4, 37, 113–14, 205–7, 209, 212
aid 139, 162, 173, 181
Alchian, A. 270, 275
Aldashev, G. 207
Alesina, A. 155, 159
algorithmic gatekeepers 226–7
Allcott, H. 224
American Political Science Association 119–20
Anderies, J.M. 124
Anderson, R.W. 183
Anderson, T.L. 112, 117
Angrist, J.D. 92
anticommons 114, 115
anti-corruption movements 175
anti-social punishment 124
Anràs, P. 54
application programming interfaces (APIs) 250
Ardanaz, M. 29
Argyres, N. 81
artificial intelligence (AI) 69, 251
asset specificity 81, 101, 102, 104, 129, 131, 198
Auriol, E. 183
Australia 173
authoritarian enclaves 30
 competitive authoritarianism 21, 22
autocracy
 autocratic control 23–5
 autocratic elections 21
 autocratic institutions 20–22
 autocratic legislatures 21
 autocrats 23, 44
Autor, D.H. 196
Azoulay, P. 67

Baker, G. 53–4, 56, 65
Bakshy, E. 222
Banerjee, A.V. 54
bankruptcy 67
Bardhan, P. 206
Bar-Gill, S. 222
Barrera, O. 224
Barro, R.J. 184
Barzel, Y. 113, 275
Becker, G.S. 34, 36, 275
behavior
 real 119–25
behavioral economics 81–2, 276
behavioral spillovers 163–4
beliefs 1, 3, 15, 20, 23–4, 76, 153–7, 163, 179–80,
 193, 206, 222–4, 265
Bénabou, R. 24
benefit–cost analyses 36
Berry, S. 207
Bessi, A. 222
Bicchieri, C. 165
big data 246, 248, 250
Bitcoin 214, 215, 219
Bleakley, H. 114
blockchain 4, 213–19
 blockchain governance paradox 217
 humans in 218–19
Bloom, N. 69
Blouin, A. 56–7, 60
Blume, L. 117
bounded rationality 82
Bowles, S. 123
Boxell, L. 223
Brandeis, L. 29
Braverman, A. 208

- “Brexit” referendum 225
 Bubb, R. 60
 bureaucracy 171
 Bush, G.H.W. 35
 Byrne, P. 217

 Calabresi, G. 128
 Camerer, C. 81
 Campante, F.R. 222
 capitalism 103, 179
 Cartwright, N. 209
 Carvalho, J.-P. 184
 Casaburi, L. 58, 60
 Cason, T. 262
 Caves, R. 63
 Ceron, A. 253
 Cheung, S.N.S. 207, 270
 China experience
 economy 136
 growth miracle 136–7
 institutional approach 135–42
 institutional substitutes 137–9
 rights hypothesis 136–7
 rule of law 135–8
 China’s reform era 135
 Chiswick, C.U. 180
 civil law 128
 civil violence 239
 clientelist parties 15
 climate change 4, 205, 208–9, 211, 237
 Clinton, W. 35, 38
 Coase, R.H. 1, 3, 4, 57, 88, 112, 115, 264, 272, 273, 276
 Coase Theorem 98, 127, 272, 273, 275
 coevolution 156
 cognition 80–86
 foundations of 81–2
 cognitive bias 23
 cognitive factors 83
 collaborative relationships, dark side of 64
 collective action 9–18, 209
 anecdotal evidence 262–3
 causal inference 262–3
 conditions of 10–12
 experimental economics 260–61
 experiments, panacea 265–6
 institutional economics 260–61
 multiple explanations, discriminating 263–5
 organizations and political parties 12–15
 in political competition 15–16
 and politics 203–4
 research 260–66
 social norms 10–12
 solving problems of 10–15
 state capacity and 16–18
 test-bedding, new institutions 261–2
 common pool resource 125
 problems 122
 Commons, J. 97, 103
 commons, study of 119–25
 economic rationality, modeling 120–22
 institutions and human behavior interactions 122–3
 communal lands 123
 Communist Party of China 140
 competition 13, 15, 29, 58, 67, 72–3, 97, 100–104, 176, 179, 181, 200, 224, 235
 conflict minerals 113
 Congressional Review Act 36
 contract 196–7
 data sources 89–90
 fixed price 57
 frictions 63
 imperfections 57
 incompleteness 63
 prevention-framed 84
 private-sector 88
 promotion-framed 84–5
 rights protection 136
 sales 56
 corruption 3, 17, 171–6, 216–17, 241
 challenges to 175–6
 Control of Corruption 243
 cultures of 173–4
 definitional digression 171–3
 formal legal institutions 173–4
 intra-elite conflicts 175–6
 measuring 243–5
 Perceptions Index 243
 Coşgel, M. 182, 183
 Costa Rica coffee chain 57
 cost-effectiveness 35
 costs distribution 10
 Cox, G. 175
 Cox, J.C. 263
 creative industries
 contracting hazards in 63–4
 decision rights 64–5
 formal contracts 65
 governance of 64–5
 relational contracts 65
 credible commitments 21
 cryptocurrencies 214–16

- culture
 coevolution, sixteenth century Portuguese
 empire 157–9
 coevolution of 153–60
 and dynamics 193–4
 evolution 156
 heterogeneity 31
 traits 158
 relationship, institutions 153–5
 Cunningham, C. 67
- data 45–7
 collection 202
 -gathering techniques 46
 science
 background 249–50
 institutional and organizational economics
 248–56
 for IOE 250–52
 for legal, political, and social institutions
 252–4
 machine learning (ML) 251–2
 methods 249–52
 text analytics 252
 web data scraping 252
- datification 248, 249
 datasets, rapid digitization 5
 De Janvry, A. 116
 de Soto, H. 217
 Deaton, A. 209
 decentralization 28, 29, 43, 45, 214–15
 decision
 -making 82
 democracy 29, 168
 measuring 242–3
 Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 113
 Demsetz, H. 111, 114, 276
 Denmark 173
 deregulation 140
 developing countries 216–17
 public goods provision 42–8
 relational contracts in 53–60
 development 2–3, 10, 16–18, 35, 44, 53, 63, 76,
 90, 115–16, 127, 145, 147–9, 151–3, 168,
 171, 173, 178, 190–94, 205–11, 219, 233–7
 difference-in-differences 93
 digital platforms 226
 digital voting system 218
 disability 202–3
 discretionary policies 137
 distributional politics 44
 divorce 189–91
- Dixit, A.K. 99
 Doepke, M. 192
 Duflo, E. 54
- Ebeling, M. 117
 echo chambers 222
 economic development 127–33, 154, 157
 institutions, conflict 148–9
 economic efficiency 270
 economic institution 272
 Ederer, F. 67
 Edlund, L. 189
 e-governance 46
 elections
 electoral competitiveness 242
 emotions 85–6, 253
 empirical research 65–7
 employment 20–24, 91, 94, 150, 222, 224, 242–3,
 252
 Enikolopov, R. 228
 Erdkamp, P. 237
 ethnic heterogeneity 10
 European Union (EU) 29
 evolutionary game theory 122
 experimental economics 260–61
 experiments 2, 4, 11–12, 38, 58, 91, 105, 119, 148,
 157, 181, 255, 260–66, 276
 experiments, replicability 123–4
 expert judgments 245
 experts and institutions, trust 225–6
 external institutions 146, 149–50
de jure–de facto gap of 150
 incomplete implementation, conflicts 150
- fake news, rise and consequences of 223–6
 Falk, A. 124–5
 family 189–94
 federal political systems 28
 federalism, power and limits of 27–31
 Fehr, E. 124–5, 262
 Ferrie, J. 114
 feudalism 179
 Finger, M. 74
 Finke, R. 183
 Finland 173
 Finley, M. 234
 firm boundaries 57, 64, 66, 202
 firms 1, 3, 53–60, 62, 67, 81, 84–6, 128, 131–3,
 138–40, 180, 198–203, 243, 275
 Fischbacher, U. 124–5
 Flaxman, S. 222
 Foley, C.F. 54

- foreign direct investment (FDI) 137, 138
 forest resources 119
 Forgas, J.P. 85
 formal governance 56–8
 formal institutions 164
 Foss, N. 65
 franchise 29, 194
 Freud, S. 179
 Fukushima Daiichi disaster 76
 fundamental transformation 101
- Gächter, S. 11, 262
 game theory 24, 122
 “games+” approach 162, 163–6
 behavioral spillovers 163–4
 informal institutions 164–6
 institutional path dependence 166
 linking institutions 164
 norms, and culture 164–6
 Gandal, N. 222
 Gans, J. 215
 gender 189–94
 Gennaioli, N. 17
 Gentzkow, M. 222–4, 228
 geographic information systems (GIS) 93, 94
 George, J.M. 85
 Ghani, T. 58
 Ghorbani, A. 76
 Gibbons, R.S. 53–4, 56, 65, 164
 Giuliano, P. 155, 159
 globalization 5, 140, 211
 Glorious Revolution 175
 Goel, S. 222
 Gollin, D. 210
 Gonzalez-Navarro, M. 116
 Gordon, H.S. 111
 Gould, E.D. 190
 Gove, M. 225
 governance 80–86
 foundations of 81–2
 frontiers for studying 85–6
 government
 collective action and 9–18
 policy making 9
 rent-seeking 46
 Gräbner, C. 76
 Great Britain 116
 Great Depression 127
 Greco-Roman economic performance 235
 Green Revolution 206
 Greif, A. 153, 164, 165
 Grim, B. 183
 Groenewegen, J.P.M. 74
 gross domestic product (GDP) 137
 Grossman, S.J. 63
 Grossman-Hart-Moore model 102
 Gruber, J. 182
guanxi 139, 140
 Guriev, S. 23–4
- Habermas, J. 165
 Halberstam, Y. 222
 Hart, O.D. 63
 Havel, V. 24
 Heller, M.A. 115
 Herrmann, B. 11
 hierarchy 80
 Hill, P.J. 112
 Hindman, M. 221
 Hopkins, K. 237
 human behavior interactions 122–4
 human capital 62, 68, 104, 178, 180, 190–92, 233, 235
 hybrid 80, 123–4
- Iannaccone, L. 179
 IMF 30, 149
 incentive-based theories 34
 incentives 9, 11, 16, 21, 38, 42, 56, 64–7, 84, 88, 114, 119–20, 122–5, 135–9, 148, 154, 163, 167, 173, 179, 193–9, 207, 223–4, 228, 260–63, 276,
 incomplete contract 63, 67, 99, 199,
 individual decision-making 80, 81
 informal agreements 53
 informal institutions 164–6
 information 45–7
 information and communication technology (ICT) 72, 73
 infrastructural capacity 31
 innovation 4, 38, 62, 64–9, 73, 84, 113, 115, 128–30, 136, 140, 156, 158, 166, 206, 218, 253
 innovative industries, contracting in 62–9
 institutional analysis, and development policy 206–8
 institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework 76
 institutional analysis of work
 collective action and politics 203–4
 jobs in firm 198–9
 measurement and data collection 202
 organization of work 197–201

- public policy, and regulation 202–3
- research frontiers in 201–4
- tasks and contracts 196–7
- tasks into jobs 197–8
- technological changes 199–201
- Institutional and Organizational Economics (IOE) 248, 249
- institutional coordination 75–6
- institutional data sources 89–90
- institutional economics 77, 78, 260–61
 - major unknowns 145–51
- institutional matrix modeling 162–9
 - “games+” approach 162, 163–6
- institutional puzzles
 - institutional explanations, core 272–5
 - recognizing and solving 269–77
- institutional research methodology 269
- institutional substitutes 137–9
 - for firms and individuals 138
 - by governments 137–8
 - limitations of 138–9
- institutions 178–84
 - coevolution, sixteenth century Portuguese empire 157–9
 - coevolution of 153–60
 - defined 146
 - delineating 146–7
 - of marriage and divorce 189–91
 - measuring 241–6
 - real 119–25
 - relationship, culture 153–5
 - types of 146
- instrumental variable (IV) approach 58, 92–3
- integration 57, 58, 66–8, 101–3, 131, 133, 184, 189, 209, 237–8
- intellectual property rights 115
- interconnection networks 74
- inter-firm governance 81
- internal institutions 145–51
 - for economic development 147–8
 - fundamental determinants of 148
 - groups, interactions 150–51
- internal labor market 199
- International Society of New Institutional Economics (ISNIE) 2
- interoperability 75
- institutions
 - poor 216–17
- institutional coordination 72–8
- insurance
 - old age 202–3
- interrelations, differentiating levels 74–6
- intrinsic motivation 18
- investment 2, 21, 24, 42–5, 63–4, 98–104, 263
- James, D. 266
- Japan 173
- jobs 196, 198–9
 - classification 202
- Johnson, N. 183
- Johnson, S. 92
- Jongman, W. 237
- JuriGlobe research group 149
- Kahneman, D. 81
- Kantorowicz, J. 94
- Kaur, S. 59, 60
- Kelly, B.T. 228
- Kenya dairy cooperative 60
- Kershbamer, R. 263
- Khemani, S. 10
- Knack, S. 11
- Knight, B. 222
- Koyama, M. 183
- Kremer, M. 59
- Kumar, P. 254
- Kuran, T. 117
- labor market 59, 149, 198–200, 203
- laboratories of democracy 30
- laboratory experiments 91
- labor contracting 199
- laws 1, 3, 5, 15, 111, 122, 168, 174, 176, 179, 184, 190–93, 202
- legal dimension 98
- legal origins 130
- legal systems 128, 163
- Leite, J.G.A. 157
- Leonard, B. 116
- Leonardi, R. 14, 150
- Lerner, J. 67, 68
- Levitsky, S. 21
- Lewis, W.A. 205
- Libecap, G.D. 114
- liberal 127
- LiCalzi, M. 164
- liquidity, enhancement 132
- Lorentzen, Peter 22
- low-valuation potential buyers 129
- Lueck, D. 114, 116, 207
- Lustig, S. 117
- Ma, S. 67
- machine learning (ML) 5, 69, 246, 251–2

- Makarin, A. 228
 management 1, 28, 36, 39, 58, 63, 66, 69, 73–4, 90,
 94, 123, 128, 207, 248
 Mantzavinos, C. 164, 166
 March, J.G. 167
 marginal private benefits 119
 market
 design 131–2
 failures 34
 forces 123
 transaction costs 199
 marriage 189–91
 Marshall, A. 138
 Marshall, W.J. 99
 marshmallow experiment 121
 Martinelli, C. 91
 Martinez-Carrasco, J. 58
 McCleary, R.M. 184
 McMillan, J. 54
 measurement 69, 145, 159, 202, 206, 241–6, 255,
 275
 media
 traditional news 221
 Melamed, D.A. 128
 mental models 164
 Merges, R. 67, 68
 Messing, S. 222
 Miceli, T.J. 182, 183
 minimum wage laws 202
 Miquel-Florensa, J. 57
 misallocation-based theories 130, 131
 Moav, O. 190
 modularity 167
 Mokyr, J. 154, 165
 Monarch, R. 59
 monopoly and anti-trust analysis 203
 Morjaria, A. 58
 Morris, I. 233, 234
 Mullainathan, S. 59, 60
 multivariate regression analysis 92
 Murphy, K.J. 53–4, 56, 65
 mutually beneficial relationship 53–60
 structure and performance, view of
 234–6
 network infrastructures 72–8
 particular attention to 72–3
 societal values 76–7
 Neururer, D. 263
 new media 221–8
 capture 227–8
 non-compliance 146
 non-cooperative behavior 11
 non-democracy 20–25
 non-local courts 116
 norms 1–16, 24–5, 44, 47, 76, 91, 111, 119–21,
 146, 149, 164–5, 168, 173–4, 178–81, 190,
 199, 228, 261–2, 265–6
 norms of cooperation 11
 North, D.C. 1–3, 9, 20, 99, 136, 146, 153, 162, 164,
 168, 175, 234, 236
 North Korea 217
 Nunn, N. 159
 Nussbaum, M.C. 77
 Nyhan, B. 224
 Obama, B. 38
 Ober, J. 235
 occupation 197
 OECD 35, 36
 off-chain networks 214
 Olson, M. 9, 99
 online platforms 94
 opportunism 54, 59, 64, 65, 80, 84, 94, 261
 organization
 discontinuities 94
 economics 64
 and political parties 12–15
 Ostrom, E. 1, 3, 9, 24, 76, 119, 262
 outdated institutions 217–18
 overconfidence bias 83
 overharvesting 121
 ownership
 incomplete 113
 Ozcan, Y. 67
 Palfrey, T.R. 91
 parental responsibility 190
 patrimonialism 158
 Petro 217
 Petrova, M. 228
 Pew Research Center 227
 Pfitze, T. 207
 Pignataro, G. 131
 Pigouvian analysis 270
 Nanetti, R.Y. 14, 150
 Narayanan, A. 215
 Nash equilibrium 122, 167
 natural language processing (NLP) 252
 natural oligopolies 224
 Negroponte, N. 221
 neo-institutionalism
 in ancient economic history 233–9
 economic breakdown 236–9

- Pischke, J.-S. 92
- Platteau, J.P. 148, 183
- Polania-Reyes, S. 123
- political
- actor 100
 - competition 15–16
 - corruption 14
 - data sources 89–90
 - dimension 98
 - economists 89
 - Instability Task Force (PITF) 254
 - institutions 42, 43–5
 - parties 2, 10, 12, 15, 17, 18, 38, 176, 193, 221, 242, 253
 - transaction costs 21, 22, 99
- “politico-ideological equilibrium” 24
- poverty 4, 46, 196
- power 3, 5, 14, 18, 23, 27–30, 34, 56, 64, 73, 76, 80, 92, 99, 103, 114, 127, 130, 133, 136, 140, 150, 154, 158, 162, 167, 174–6, 192, 200, 203, 206, 209, 228, 238, 241, 248, 260
- preference falsification 24
- price theory 269
- principal agent theory 63–5, 128, 158, 269
- private for-profit use 130
- privatization 94, 114–15
- production function 121
- productivity 44, 112, 119, 131–3, 136, 179, 205–10
- programmatically parties 13–15
- propensity score matching and controls 91–2
- property rights 127–33, 274
- and data labor 201–2
 - economic 273, 274
 - and economic outcomes 128–30
 - emergence of 111–14
 - endogenous 128
 - equilibrium 132
 - ex post misallocations vs disincentives 128–30
 - firms’ 131
 - horizontal 132
 - original owner’s 130
 - questions of 111–17
 - role of state 115–17
 - size and shape of 114–15
 - weak 131
- Protestant Reformation 179
- Przeworski, A. 242, 243
- public choice theory 34
- public contract
- accounts 88
 - analysis 90
 - design 89
 - difference-in-differences 93
 - instrumental variables 92–3
 - laboratory experiments 91
 - and politics 94–5
 - propensity score matching and controls 91–2
 - randomized control trials (RCTs) 91
 - regression discontinuity design (RDD) 93–4
 - research, tools and approaches 88–95
 - synthetic controls 93
 - theoretical frameworks of 89
- public goods prioritization 43–5
- public goods provision 42–8
- public-sector contracts 88
- public service delivery 45
- Putnam, R.D. 14, 150
- Qin, B. 228
- randomized control trials (RCTs) 59, 91, 209
- Rao, J.M. 222
- rationality 121
- Reagan, R. 35, 38
- redundancy 167
- Reed, T. 58
- regression discontinuity design (RDD) 93–4
- regulations
- analysis of 35–6
 - performance of 34–40
 - review of 35–6
 - transparency of 35–6
- regulatory budget 38
- regulatory capture 34
- regulatory cost budgets 38–9
- regulatory focus theory 81
- application of 83–5
- regulatory institutions 34–40
- regulatory performance
- 1-in/X-out and regulatory cost budgets 38–9
 - ad hoc retrospective reviews 37–8
 - cumulative regulatory costs 39
 - non-regulatory contexts 39–40
 - opportunities for research 36–40
 - prospective reviews 36–7
- Reifler, J. 224
- relational contracts 53–60, 68
- and empirical challenges 53–4
 - and formal governance 56–8
 - testing for 54–6
- relational practices 58
- religion 149, 178–84
- and economic growth 181–2

- economics of 179–80
- freedom, state and 182–3
- institutions and 178–9
- social practices and 184
- theoretical frameworks for 180–81
- rents
 - future 54, 55
- repeated relationships 57
- representative public good 44
- research opportunities 68, 272
- residual control rights 101
- revealed preference 55
- Rieder, B. 227
- rights hypothesis 136–7
- Riker, W. 31
- Rios-Morales, R. 253
- risk 57–8, 64, 89, 104, 129, 133, 159, 200, 203, 207–8, 239, 243, 253–5, 275
- Robinson, J. 236, 237
- robust institutional design 166–8
- Rodden, J.A. 28
- Rogerson, R. 210
- Roman Empire 238
- rule of law 136
 - China transition 141–2
 - substitution mechanisms for 137–8
- Sadoulet, E. 116
- safeguards 84
- Saller, R. 233
- Scartascini, C. 29
- Scheidel, W. 233
- Schmidt, E. 227
- Schmidt-Eisenlohr, T. 59
- Scott, J.C. 24
- sect members 181
- selection bias 266
- self-enforcing agreements 65
- semi-competitive elections 23
- Sen, A.K. 77
- Shapiro, J.M. 222, 223
- Shariq, S. 164
- Simhon, A. 190
- Simon, H.A. 82
- Sire, G. 227
- situational closeness 245
- skills and training 203
- “smart” technologies 73, 76
- Smith, A. 179
- social
 - capital 14, 182
 - ecological system (SES) framework 76
 - knowledge 193
 - media 253
 - norms 10–12, 124
 - power 31
 - practices 184
- Social Tension Indicator (STI) 253
- societal values 76–7
- Society for Institutional & Organizational Economics (SIOE) 2
- soft budget constraints 28
- Sonin, K. 23, 24
- Spiller, P.T. 63, 66, 93
- Startz, M. 55
- state capacity 16–18
- Staten, M. 270
- stationary bandits 44
- Stepan, A. 30
- Stephens-Davidowitz, S. 252
- Stigler, G.J. 275
- Stiglitz, J. 208
- strategic default 56
- Strömberg, D. 224, 228
- subnational authoritarianism 29
- substitution mechanisms 139–40
 - for rule of law 137–8
- superstition 178
- Sustainable Development Goals 42
- synthetic controls 93
- system control 74
- Taddy, M. 228
- tasks 196–7
- technical coordination 75–6
- technology 45–7
- “ten ton turkeys” syndrome 63–4, 66
- Tertilt, M. 191, 192
- text mining 258
- Thomas, R. 234
- Thöni, C. 11
- Tianjiao, J. 67
- Tirole, J. 24, 64–8
- trade-off 57, 66, 89, 97, 103–4, 121, 128, 167, 275
- transactions 97–105
 - costs 23, 104, 131, 132, 198, 214–15, 264, 273, 275
 - costs economics 3, 81–3
 - fundamental claims 98
- transactors’ choices 97–105
- transformative movement 1
- transition 214–15
- transparency 35, 40, 46–7, 137, 243

- Treisman, D. 23, 24
 Trump, D. 35, 38
 trust 264
 trusted transactions 213
 trustworthiness 264
 Tversky, A. 81
- Umbeck, J. 270
 unbundling, network operation 73
 unemployment 202–3
 Unions 14, 103–4, 197, 199, 203
 United Kingdom 38, 225
United Mine Workers v. Pennington (1965) 104
 United Nations Conference on Trade and
 Development (UNCTAD) Database 90
 United States 35, 176
 unsupervised learning 251
 US Internal Revenue Service 17
 utility 122, 217, 260, 276
- value of relationship 54
 van Reenen, J. 69
 Veblen, T. 99
 vehicles-to-grid-service 73
 Venezuela 217
 Verboven, K. 234
- violence 158
 Voth, H.-J. 17
- Wang, W. 67
 Ward-Perkins, B. 238
 Warglien, M. 164
 Warzynski, F. 66
 Way, L.A. 21
 weak institutionalized environments 227–8
 wealthy democracies 172, 173
 Weber, M. 137, 179, 180
 Weingast, B.R. 20, 99, 175
 West Africa 91
 Wibbels, E. 28
 Williamson, O.E. 1, 2, 63, 80–82, 84, 97, 102, 103,
 198
 women's status 191–3
 Wong, J.C. 191
 Woodberry, R.D. 180
 Woodruff, C. 54
 World Bank 30, 254
 World Values Survey 11, 157
 Wu, Y. 228
- Zingales, Luigi 103
 Zubrickas, R. 262

