1. Does customary international tax law exist?

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1. INTRODUCTION

Customary international law is law that “results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”1 “International agreements create law for states parties thereto and may lead to the creation of customary international law when such agreements are intended for adherence by states generally and are in fact widely accepted.”2

Does customary international law (CIL) exist in tax? There are over 3,000 bilateral tax treaties, and they are about 80% identical to each other.3 But do they create CIL that binds in the absence of a binding treaty, as for example the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties binds the United States, which has not ratified it? This chapter will argue that the answer is sometimes yes, using four examples: jurisdiction to tax, the Permanent Establishment (PE) threshold, the Arm’s Length Standard (ALS), and non-discrimination.

As an initial matter, it is important to note that the continuing relevance of CIL has been subjected to significant criticism.4 However, most of these critiques are based on comparing CIL to multilateral treaties, and this criticism seems not to apply to CIL in tax law since it is almost entirely based on treaties. The key issue is whether the rules that are

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1 Rest. 3d (For. Rel.) sec. 102(2). For other definitions see, e.g., the International Law Association (ILA) definition: a “rule of customary international law is one which is created and sustained by the constant and uniform practice of States and other subjects of international law in or impinging upon their international legal relations, in circumstances which give rise to a legitimate expectation of similar conduct in the future.” International Law Association (ILA) London Conference Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law (2000). The U.N. International Law Commission states that “determining a rule of customary international law requires establishing the existence of two constituent elements: a general practice, and acceptance as law (opinio juris).” Draft conclusions on identification of customary international law, with commentaries, adopted by the International Law Commission of the United Nations at 124. The Report will appear in the Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2018, vol. II, Part Two, http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/1_13_2018.pdf. However, such an approach has not gone uncontested. See, for instance, the ILA, that considers that “it is not usually necessary to demonstrate the existence of the subjective element before a customary rule can be said to have come into being.” For the ILA, the main point is that “it is not necessary for an individual state to have consented (still less, to be proved to have consented) to a rule for it to be bound, provided the other conditions in Part II are satisfied.” ILA 2000, at 10. For a general discussion, see Irma Johanna Mosquera, BEPS Principal Purpose Test and Customary International Law (April, 2019).

2 Rest. 3d (For. Rel.) sec. 102(3).


found in the tax treaties can bind countries that are not parties to these treaties. As long as this argument can persuade courts, CIL in tax law will exist, regardless of the theoretical debates surrounding its nature and provenance.

2. JURISDICTION TO TAX

There are two widely accepted bases of jurisdiction to tax: residence and source, which are the tax law equivalents of nationality and territoriality, the two bases of jurisdiction in international law. For a country to have the right to tax income, that income must either belong to a resident, because residents may be taxed on world-wide income, or it must have a source in the taxing country, because a country may tax non-residents on income sourced within it. See, for example, the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) sections 1 and 11 (imposing world-wide taxation on U.S. resident individuals and corporations) and IRC sections 2(d) and 11(b) (limiting such taxation to U.S.-source income for non-resident individuals and corporations respectively).

The problem with these limits on jurisdiction to tax is that a resident can easily form a non-resident corporation and earn foreign source income through that corporation, which means that the income is not subject to current tax because it is neither income of a resident nor from a domestic source. This problem is particularly acute for a country like the United States which (a) defines residence of corporations mechanically by reference to place of incorporation, (b) allows taxpayers to choose which foreign entities are recognized as corporations, and (c) generally respects the separate status of corporations and shareholders.

In the 1930s, this state of affairs led the United States to consider whether it could tax a foreign corporation controlled by U.S. residents on foreign source income. At the time, there were very few tax treaties, so the jurisdictional limit was not treaty based (and, in addition, under the U.S. Constitution, Congress can override treaties). Nevertheless, the United States chose not to challenge the jurisdictional limit, suggesting that it regarded itself bound by it because most countries practiced it out of a sense of legal obligation. The fact that the foreign corporation was controlled by a U.S. resident meant that the United States could have collected any tax imposed on the foreign corporation by putting a lien on the controlling shareholders’ assets, so the issue was not a practical limit but a legal one.

The context was a series of congressional hearings that revealed that rich Americans were using “incorporated pocketbooks” offshore to avoid U.S. tax on their income. For example, Jacob Schick, the inventor of the Schick disposable razor, transferred his patent to it to a Bermuda corporation that accumulated the royalties; Schick later proceeded to retire to Bermuda, gave up his U.S. citizenship, and lived on the accumulated tax-free profits.

To address this problem, the United States adopted in 1937 a rule that taxed shareholders in “Foreign Personal Holding Corporations” (FPHCs). An FPHC was defined as a foreign corporation controlled (over 50% by vote) by five or fewer U.S. resident individuals, and whose income was over 60% passive (because passive income was considered easier to shift than active income). At the same time, the United States adopted a similar rule for “Personal Holding Corporations” (PHCs). A PHC was defined identically to the
FPHC, but was a domestic corporation (at the time, like today, it was advantageous for the rich to earn passive income through PHCs because the corporate rate was about half the top individual rate).

Why were there two different rules, one for PHCs and the other for FPHCs? The only difference was that PHCs were domestic (resident) and FPHCs were foreign (non-resident). The reason can be seen in the taxing mechanism: PHCs were taxed at the corporate level at the top individual rate, but FPHCs were not taxed at all. Instead, the United States taxed the U.S. shareholders on a deemed dividend of the accumulated passive income of the FPHC. The reason was that the United States considered it a breach of international law to tax a non-resident on foreign source income, because there was neither residence nor source jurisdiction. Since there was no controlling treaty, the international law involved had to be CIL.

The deemed dividend rule was upheld by Judge Frank of the Second Circuit without paying any attention to its international law implications. Yet, it clearly represented a major expansion of the U.S. residence taxing jurisdiction, since taxing a deemed dividend is economically equivalent to taxing a foreign corporation directly on foreign source income. It could certainly be argued in 1943 that this rule was a breach of international law, just as Judge Hand’s *Alcoa* decision (1945), which invented the effects doctrine, was likewise arguably a breach of international law.

The impact of the deemed dividend rule was greatly expanded when the Kennedy administration decided in 1961 to propose applying the same rule to all income of corporations that were over 50% controlled by large (10% by vote each) U.S. shareholders (*i.e.*, to subsidiaries of U.S. multinationals or Controlled Foreign Companies [CFCs]). Ultimately, this resulted in the enactment in 1962 of “Subpart F” which applied the deemed dividend rule to certain types of income (mostly passive income) of all CFCs.

Again, there was no international law challenge to the deemed dividend rule. Instead, other countries began to copy the CFC regime: Germany (1972), Canada (1975), Japan (1978), France (1980), the United Kingdom (1984), and others. Currently, there are over 30 countries with CFC rules, and the number is likely to increase because every E.U. Member State now has to have CFC rules. Thus, it would seem that the CFC concept has arguably become part of CIL, just like the expansion of territorial jurisdiction over international waters rapidly changed international law from the 1970s onward.

Even more striking is the fact that many of the countries adopting the CFC rule abandoned the deemed dividend idea, which can lead to significant difficulties in practice, in favour of direct taxation of the CFC (*i.e.*, direct taxation of a foreign corporation on foreign source income just because it is controlled by residents. (See, for example, Sweden and France). Thus, the jurisdictional rule has been changing and no longer seems to require a deemed dividend. Indeed, the IRS itself has adopted this view because it now believes that the PHC regime, as well as the older accumulated earnings tax regime, both apply directly to foreign corporations even though their effect is to tax the corporation

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5 *Eder v. Commissioner*, 138 F.2d 27 (1943). Although, of course, even if he had paid attention, he would have upheld it, since Congress can override CIL as well as treaties by legislation.

6 *United States v. Alcoa*, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).

7 IRC sections 951–960. The deemed dividend rule is still with us since it was used as the basis of GILTI.

on foreign source income. This is particularly striking for PHCs because it was so clear in 1937 that the United States had no jurisdiction to tax foreign corporations on foreign source income that Congress did not bother to specify that a PHC could not be a foreign corporation (while at the same time adopting the parallel FPHC regime explicitly for foreign corporations). This oversight now enables the IRS to argue that under the new understanding of jurisdictional limits, the PHC and the Accumulated Earnings Tax rules apply to foreign corporations.

Claiming that nationality jurisdiction applies to foreign corporations just because they are controlled by nationals is a striking departure from ordinary international law. Compare, for example, the oft recurring disputes about the extraterritorial application of international sanctions. In both the Fruehauf (1965) and Sensor (1982) cases, the foreign courts explicitly rejected U.S. claims to require foreign subsidiaries of U.S. multinationals to obey U.S. sanctions aimed at China and the USSR, respectively. In Sensor, the Dutch court went through all the possible grounds for jurisdiction and explicitly found that none applied. It was clear that nationality jurisdiction did not apply even though the subsidiary was controlled from the United States.

What, then, enables the United States and other countries to expand nationality jurisdiction to subsidiaries in the tax area? The explanation is the “first bite at the apple rule,” adopted by the League of Nations in 1923. Under that rule, the source (territorial) jurisdiction has the primary right to tax income arising within it, and the residence (nationality) jurisdiction is obligated to prevent double taxation by granting an exemption or a credit. Thus, permitting the expansion of residence jurisdiction to CFCs does not harm the right of source jurisdictions to tax them first; residence (nationality) jurisdiction only applies as a residual matter when the source jurisdiction abstains from taxing. This still leads sometimes to complaints by source jurisdictions that the residence jurisdiction is taking away their right to effectively grant tax holidays to foreign investors.

In general, I believe that this episode is a good illustration of the existence and growth of CIL in the tax area. In the period from the 1930s to the 1960s, there was a clear rule of CIL that prohibited taxing foreign corporations on foreign source income. That rule was universally observed and was considered binding, as illustrated by the United States avoiding an outright breach through the deemed dividend mechanism. However, once a lot of countries had changed the rule by taxing CFCs directly, the United States did not consider it binding any more, as indicated by applying the PHC regime to foreign corporations.

3. THE PE THRESHOLD

The PE threshold is included in all the tax treaties: A source country may not tax business profits unless the non-resident corporation earning these profits has a PE in the source state. The PE rule stems from nineteenth century treaties, was included in the first models drafted by the League of Nations in the 1920s, and is found in almost every tax treaty negotiated since then. But is it CIL (i.e., does it bind countries in the absence of a treaty)?

The core of the PE rule is the requirement of a physical presence, either directly (e.g., an office or factory or employees) or through a dependent agent. Interestingly, the physical presence requirement is also found in U.S. tax law in non-treaty situations. For example, in
the *Piedras Negras* case from 1942 (*i.e.*, long before there was a treaty between the United States and Mexico), a radio station broadcasting in English from Mexico into Texas and deriving advertising revenue from Texas was held not to have a U.S. trade or business (the IRC equivalent for PE) because it had no physical presence in the United States. 9 But this rule is not derived from CIL, it is a purely domestic U.S. requirement. Could the United States abandon it without offending CIL?10

I think the answer is no, and that this is evidenced by the recent behaviour of the United Kingdom in the digital economy context. The basic problem of the PE rule is that it is hopelessly obsolete in the twenty-first century because multinationals can earn billions from a taxing jurisdiction without having any assets, employees, or even direct sales there. (Facebook does not have any of these traditional items, it just has users.) This is why there is a growing consensus that the PE threshold must be abandoned in favour of something else, like the E.U. proposal for a “substantial digital presence.” The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) has recently set out three options for reform in a consultation document, and they all abandon the PE threshold.

But what are countries to do in the meantime if they wish to tax the digital giants, and the PE threshold is included in their treaties? The interesting answer comes from the United Kingdom, the first country to adopt a “Google tax.” The United Kingdom’s “Diverted Profits Tax” (DPT) became effective on April 1, 2015 (*i.e.*, before the OECD finalized the BEPS project that was supposed to solve this problem).11 The DPT is intended primarily to address structures like Google’s Double Irish Dutch Sandwich, which is contained in the guidance published by HMRC as Example 3.

Under Example 3, the U.S. parent of a multinational group (Company A) owns a subsidiary incorporated in Ireland that is treated under Irish law as resident in a tax haven (Company D) which owns the IP for the rest of the world. Company D licenses the IP to Company C in the Netherlands, which in turn licenses it to Company B in Ireland. Company B owns Company E which provides sales and service support in the United Kingdom, with all sales contracts being finalized by Company B in Ireland.

Under this structure, U.K. tax is only applied to the cost-plus profits of Company E, which are minimal. Companies B, C, and D do not have a PE in the United Kingdom and are not subject to tax. Company B is taxable in Ireland, but most of its profits are payable as a royalty to Company C, which in turn pays most of its profits to Company D in the tax haven. There is no withholding tax on the payment from Company B to C (because of the Ireland–Netherlands tax treaty and the E.U. directives) or from C to D (because the Netherlands does not tax outbound royalties). The U.S. CFC rules (pre-Tax Cuts and Jobs Act) do not apply because, other than Company D, all the entities in the group are disregarded under the check box, and their activities attributed to Company D (regarded under the U.S. rules as resident in Ireland).

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10 As a constitutional matter, Congress could enact any rule it wanted because it can override CIL just as it can override treaties; the question is whether it would be overriding CIL and not just treaties if it abolished the physical presence requirement.
11 3 FA 2015, sections 80, 81, 86. 4 HMRC, Diverted Profits Tax: Interim Guidance (March 2015) 37.
The DPT subjects this arrangement to U.K. tax, because Company B’s affairs are arranged so as to avoid a U.K. PE. The section 86 charge will apply where there is a non-U.K. resident company (Company B) that is carrying on a trade. A U.K. resident (Company E, the “avoided PE”) is carrying on activities in the United Kingdom in connection with the supply of goods or services by Company B. It is reasonable to assume that the activity of Company E or Company B was designed to avoid Company B being subject to U.K. CIT. There is a “tax mismatch” in that the tax paid by Company B in Ireland is less than 80% of the tax avoided by Company E; and tax reduction was one of the main purposes of the arrangement. If these conditions are satisfied, a 25% DPT applies to the diverted profits (i.e., the profits that would have been taxable to Company B in the United Kingdom had it had a PE), measured initially as 30% of the deductions taken by Company B, with later adjustments (and credits for any foreign tax).

The important point to realize is that the United Kingdom could have just overridden the PE threshold and taxed Company B directly, because in the United Kingdom, as in other common law jurisdictions (e.g., Australia), treaties are not self-executing: They have to be implemented by an Act of Parliament, and that means that they can be overridden by a later Act of Parliament. But the U.K. Government clearly felt itself bound by the PE threshold, or else it would not have devised such a complicated new tax that is not subject to the treaties (because it is not an income tax) and therefore not subject to CIL either (since CIL in this case stems from the treaties). This suggests that the PE threshold is in fact CIL.12

4. THE ALS

The ALS was invented by Mitchell Carroll in the 1930s and is now incorporated into articles 7 and 9 of all the treaties.13 It states that in establishing the profit allocation between related parties (parent and subsidiary, or head office and branch) the proper standard is to treat the parties as if they were dealing with each other at arm’s length.

It has long been argued that the ALS is CIL.14 What is hard to prove is that countries consider themselves bound by the ALS in the absence of a treaty, because the ALS is the most common element in all the treaties.15 But a recent U.S. case is a good example. Altera involved a cost sharing agreement between Altera, Inc. and its Cayman Islands subsidiary, and the United States does not have a tax treaty with the Cayman Islands. The issue in Altera was whether the pool of costs that were covered by the cost sharing agreement had

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12 It should be noted, however, that Australia, which also has the power to override treaties, chose to avoid the PE threshold by enacting in 2015 an anti-avoidance rule in the income tax. Australia argued that this was not a violation of the treaties because it was an anti-abuse measure (it amended Australia’s GAAR). India and other countries enacted non-income “equalization levies,” but that was presumably done to avoid the treaties, not CIL, especially since some of the enacting countries (e.g., Spain) are civil law countries in which treaties are superior to domestic law.

13 See the 1933 League of Nations draft model tax treaty, which envisaged formulary apportionment as an alternative to ALS in the PE context.


15 Ash and Marian, supra note 3.
to include the cost of stock options, even though there was overwhelming evidence that unrelated parties dealing at arm’s length would not have shared those costs.

The IRS had previously litigated and lost the same issue in *Xilinx*, which involved a cost sharing agreement with Xilinx’s subsidiary in Ireland, so that the U.S.-Ireland tax treaty applied. Thus, when confronted with *Xilinx*, the Treasury could have distinguished it as a treaty case and amended the 1.482–7 cost sharing regulation any way it wanted for non-treaty cases. Specifically, the Treasury could have relied on the legislative history of the commensurate with income standard of IRC 482.

Congress stated that, for a cost sharing agreement to satisfy the commensurate with income requirement, “the income allocated among the parties” should “reasonably reflect the actual economic activity undertaken by each.” This means that “the cost-sharer would be expected to bear its portion of all research and development costs.”16 Moreover, Congress also stated that this result should govern regardless of what unrelated parties would have done at arm’s length, stating that the Treasury would not be required to focus on “industry norms or other unrelated party transactions” if they would not exist in a particular context (like “related party intangibles transfers”).17 Congress explained that such transactions rarely if ever occur between unrelated parties:

> A fundamental problem is the fact that the relationship between related parties is different from that of unrelated parties . . . The problems are particularly acute in the case of transfers of high-profit potential intangibles . . . Industry norms for transfers to unrelated parties of less profitable intangibles frequently are not realistic comparables in these cases. Transfers between related parties do not involve the same risks as transfers to unrelated parties.18

Thus, the Treasury could have just stated that the inclusion of the cost of stock options in the cost sharing pool between related parties is an exception to the ALS. This is because there are no realistic comparables and precisely because unrelated parties would not have agreed to share cost of stock options since the value of the options depends on the performance of an entity that by definition they do not control (i.e., an unrelated party). The *Xilinx* outcome, after all, warned the Treasury that not to address the ALS risked losing the case. Instead, the Treasury, in a non-treaty context in which it was not bound by the ALS (which is for domestic law purposes only a regulatory requirement, because it is not in IRC section 482), chose to stick with the ALS and risk the consequences.

The strong implication is that the Treasury believes itself bound by the ALS even when there is no formal treaty-based or statutory requirement to be so bound (i.e., where there is no treaty), and that is the essence of *opinio juris*. Thus, I believe the Treasury’s behaviour indicates that it believes the ALS is part of CIL, and hence that CIL exists.

## 5. NON-DISCRIMINATION

The prohibition against discrimination is included in all the tax treaties (article 24). Is it CIL? The behaviour of the United States in two episodes suggests that the United States

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believes it is. The first is the enactment of the original IRC section 163(j) in 1989. The purpose of this section was to limit the deductibility of interest paid to foreign related parties, but the United States decided to apply it to “tax-exempt related parties,” even though no U.S. tax-exempt ever owns over 50% in the stock of a for-profit corporation (or else it would be subject to Unrelated Business Income Tax). The United States could have made 163(j) a treaty override, but its behaviour suggests that it was reluctant to flaunt the non-discrimination norm by explicitly applying 163(j) only to foreign related parties. This suggests that non-discrimination is CIL.

The second is the enactment of the Base Erosion and Anti-Abuse Tax (BEAT) in 2017. The BEAT explicitly only applies to foreign related parties. As a result, it arguably violates non-discrimination although, in my opinion, it is not actually discriminatory because it also applies to payments from U.S. parents to CFCs. Importantly, there is no indication in the legislative history that the BEAT was intended to override treaties. This opened the door to some commentators to argue that the BEAT is in fact subject to non-discrimination, and that it should not apply in the treaty context. The reluctance of the United States to state that it was overriding article 24 suggests that it believes non-discrimination to be CIL. It was even suggested in the congressional hearing that the BEAT is a non-income tax, similar to the U.K. behaviour in the DPT episode, and this likewise suggests a reluctance to appear to violate non-discrimination when there is no treaty bar from doing so (since the treaties can be overridden).

6. CONCLUSION: WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE?

I believe that the above episodes are sufficient to prove that CIL exists in some cases of international tax law. But it should also be admitted that these are relatively limited instances. Like the author of “The Single Tax Principle,” I do not believe that the broader principles that in my opinion underlie the International Tax Regime (ITR), namely the benefits and single tax principles, are CIL because they are violated too frequently in practice. Even the prohibition against double taxation that motivated the establishment of the ITR is frequently violated.21

Does the existence of CIL in tax law make a practical difference? After all, in the United States, CIL as well as treaties can be overridden by Congress through unilateral

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19 Arguably, though, it violates article 24(4) because it denies a deduction for payments to a foreign related party that is fully deductible when paid to a domestic related party. Still, it can be argued that formally the BEAT does not deny any deductions (it is an alternative minimum tax on a redefined tax base).


21 See the debate about whether the human rights treaties are CIL, since they are almost universally both ratified and violated in practice.
legislation, and perhaps even by the Treasury through administrative action. As the Supreme Court stated in 1900:

International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations . . .\textsuperscript{22}

But there are three situations in which CIL is nevertheless relevant as a practical matter: in countries where international law is superior to domestic law, or in international tribunals; in cases where there is no federal law or binding treaty; and in state law.

\section{Outside the United States}

Outside the United States, international law may be treated as superior to domestic law. This is certainly true of treaties (the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties explicitly rejects treaty overrides, and it is generally binding directly or as CIL, since almost every country other than the United States has ratified it), but it can also be true of CIL. This is of particular interest to multinationals that may in some cases be able to invoke CIL in international tribunals.

The pending arbitration between Vodafone Plc, the U.K. and Netherlands based telecommunications giant, and the government of India is a good example. Vodafone invoked arbitration proceedings under both the India–U.K. and the India–Netherlands investment agreements to resolve its long-running tax dispute with India involving a 2007 acquisition. That dispute involves the tax treatment of capital gains from the Vodafone Group’s 2007 acquisition of a majority stake in what was Hutchison Whampoa Ltd.’s call centre business, Hutchison Essar. Although the transaction was impacted by the sale of shares in a Caymans holding company, the Indian tax authority argued that Vodafone was required to withhold some $2 billion in capital gains tax at source. However, Vodafone argued that it had no tax liability on the transaction because the transfer of shares took place outside India.

The Indian Supreme Court decided the case in Vodafone’s favour in January 2012, but shortly after, in March, the Indian government announced surprise retroactive legislative changes, explicitly stating that the term “transfer” includes asset transfers undertaken indirectly through the sale of shares of legal entities. In the arbitration proceedings, Vodafone has argued that CIL governs the case and that under CIL there was no tax nexus in India, and that the retroactive tax amounted to an expropriation. Because the case is in an international arbitration tribunal, CIL could decide the outcome despite the contrary explicit Indian legislation.\textsuperscript{23}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{22} The \textit{Paquete Habana}, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (emphasis added).

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Importantly, in the European Union there has already been an advisory opinion from the legal service of the Council of the European Union that a proposed financial transaction tax represents a breach of CIL because of its extraterritorial reach (because it is imposed, *e.g.*, on sales of stock of French companies in London).24 However, the European Court of Justice rejected a challenge to the FTT as premature.

### 6.2 U.S.-Federal

As the Supreme Court has stated, CIL can be applied in U.S. courts where there is no explicit federal legislation. This is basically the taxpayer’s position in *Altera*, although it is not arguing the case explicitly on CIL grounds, but rather based on the Treasury’s refusal to state that the cost sharing regulations are an exception to the ALS. In my opinion this argument is misguided because Congress overrode the ALS in this context when it amended IRC section 482 in 1986, and the Ninth Circuit panel agreed. Another instance where U.S. taxpayers could invoke CIL is in the definition of U.S. trade or business, as in the *Piedras Negras* case (the physical presence requirement), because the term is not defined in the IRC. It is also possible to imagine a non-discrimination argument being made in the absence of a treaty on CIL grounds.

In principle this is a broad area for lawyers to cover, because it is definitely plausible to argue that all the 80% of the treaties that are identical constitute CIL and are binding on the United States in the absence of a treaty, or at least an explicit contrary practice in U.S. treaties, legislation, or regulation. One intriguing possibility is the new Principal Purpose Test (PPT), which under the OECD BEPS project and the Multilateral Instrument (MLI) must be included in every tax treaty that is governed by the MLI (a rapidly increasing number). The PPT states that treaty-based transactions can be rejected if a primary purpose of the transaction is to take advantage of the treaty. This language can also be found in the Limitation of Benefits (LOB) provision of some U.S. treaties. It will certainly be possible to argue in a few years that the PPT is CIL, since most of the world accepts it, and it certainly has good U.S. roots in the business purpose/economic substance line of cases.25 Thus, it may be possible for the IRS one day to argue that a transaction that passes technical muster under the LOB of a treaty should nevertheless be rejected under the PPT even though the treaty does not contain the PPT language. Of course, the taxpayer will argue that the LOB overrides CIL and that the United States has rejected the PPT.26 It will be an interesting case.
6.3 U.S.-State

The most obvious example of the U.S. relevance of CIL is in state taxation cases because CIL is international law and equivalent to a treaty and, therefore, applies to and overrides contrary state law under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, despite the fact that U.S. tax treaties generally do not apply to state taxation (except for the non-discrimination provision). This is why it has been argued that the Supreme Court was wrong in deciding Barclays against strong evidence that the ALS was CIL, and that the Clinton administration was on good legal grounds in persuading the states not to apply formulary apportionment outside the United States despite their victories in Container and Barclays. All of the areas of CIL mentioned above (jurisdiction, PE, and the ALS) could in principle be invoked against the states.

REFERENCES


