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Daniel Farber

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Daniel A. Farber

Deadlines are a ubiquitous feature of lawmaking in contexts ranging from federal agency rulemakings to international negotiations. Despite the expectation that these deadlines will drive conflicting parties toward agreement or overcome bureaucratic inertia, their impact on decision-making is mixed, often producing only modest improvements in speed, and perhaps sometimes none at all. On the downside, deadlines can sometimes reduce the quality of decisions or encourage brinksmanship when missing a deadline would have draconian consequences. If there is a case for deadlines, then, it is an uneasy one. Game theory suggests some potential ways to increase the effectiveness of deadlines as action-forcing strategies, such as improving information sharing between actors and providing enforcement mechanisms for negotiated outcomes. Keywords: statutory deadlines, regulatory deadlines, lawmaking brinksmanship, negotiation theory

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Daniel A. Farber

Rather than being keyed to any one legal system, this chapter investigates the constitutional and administrative challenges of climate change at a more general level. It identifies problems that cut across legal systems and suggests some effective approaches to solving them. The chapter first discusses the constitutional problems involved in responding to the risks of climate disasters, including both structural issues such as federalism and potential violations of property rights and other individual rights. It then considers aspects of administrative law relevant to climate disasters, including the need to ensure government transparency and accountability as well as the significance of public participation.

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Daniel A. Farber and Michael Faure

The field of disaster law has witnessed a huge surge in interest over the past few years. Building widespread recognition of the shortcomings of legal systems faced with disasters, academics have increasingly turned their attention to exploring how these failings can be addressed. This research review focuses on the legal and economic aspects of disaster law and pays particular attention to the legalities of catastrophes.
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Daniel A. Farber and Michael Faure

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Daniel A. Farber and Michael Faure

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Daniel A. Farber and Michael Faure

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Edited by Daniel A. Farber and Anne Joseph O’Connell

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Edited by Daniel A. Farber and Anne Joseph O’Connell

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Edited by Daniel A. Farber and Anne Joseph O’Connell

Public choice theory sheds light on many aspects of legislation, regulation, and constitutional law and is critical to a sophisticated understanding of public policy. The editors of this landmark addition to the law and economics literature have organized the Handbook into four main areas of inquiry: foundations, constitutional law and democracy, administrative design and action, and specific statutory schemes. The original contributions, authored by top scholars in the field, provide helpful introductions to important topics in public choice and public law while also exploring the institutional complexity of American democracy.