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This chapter introduces the institutional economics of distributed ledger technology. Blockchains are a distinct general purpose technology that provide reduce the transaction costs of exchange; that is, they are an institutional technology. The chapter presents the economic attributes of blockchains in the framework developed by Oliver Williamson. Blockchains complement and compete with other institutions that work to mitigate opportunism by industrialising trust. The chapter concludes with a comparative institutional analysis of blockchains as an institutional technology.

This chapter considers blockchains as constitutional orders. Blockchains compete and complement with firms, markets, governments, clubs, and the commons. Additionally, their versatility (the constitution can be varied for each application) allow them to adopt the characteristics of other institutions. The authors call this the ‘universal Turing institution’. The chapter then explores the dynamics of institutional and constitutional innovation in distributed ledgers.

Ledgers are a fundamental economic technology. This chapter develops the ledger-centric view of the economy. Ledgers provide an underlying infrastructure for exchange by allowing actors to prove, validate, and verify property ownership. In this sense ledgers map economic, political and social relationships. The chapter offers three analytic categories of ledgers (general, actual, and perfect), and considers the evolution of ledger technology in this context. Finally, the chapter tackles ledgers as rule sets for economic coordination, and the significance of this for interoperability.