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- Series: New Horizons in Institutional and Evolutionary Economics series x
Institutional Variety in East Asia
Formal and Informal Patterns of Coordination
Edited by Werner Pascha, Cornelia Storz and Markus Taube
National Competitiveness and Economic Growth
The Changing Determinants of Economic Performance in the World Economy
Timo J. Hämäläinen
Evolutionary Economic Thought
European Contributions and Concepts
Edited by Jürgen G. Backhaus
Evolutionary Economics and Environmental Policy
Survival of the Greenest
Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh, Albert Faber, Annemarth M. Idenburg and Frans H. Oosterhuis
Understanding the Blockchain Economy
An Introduction to Institutional Cryptoeconomics
Chris Berg, Sinclair Davidson and Jason Potts
Chris Berg, Sinclair Davidson and Jason Potts
Institutional cryptoeconomics is the application of the transaction cost economics of Ronald Coase, James Buchanan, Oliver Williamson, and Elinor Ostrom to blockchain technology. This chapter provides an introduction to the book. It introduces the origins and technology of distributed ledgers with the 2008 invention of Bitcoin by the pseudonymous Satoshi Nakamoto, as well as the allied technologies (such as smart contracts) that form a key part of later analysis. It also provides a methodological observation about the analytic role of ‘high-trust economics’.
Chris Berg, Sinclair Davidson and Jason Potts
This chapter introduces the institutional economics of distributed ledger technology. Blockchains are a distinct general purpose technology that provide reduce the transaction costs of exchange; that is, they are an institutional technology. The chapter presents the economic attributes of blockchains in the framework developed by Oliver Williamson. Blockchains complement and compete with other institutions that work to mitigate opportunism by industrialising trust. The chapter concludes with a comparative institutional analysis of blockchains as an institutional technology.
Chris Berg, Sinclair Davidson and Jason Potts
This chapter considers blockchains as constitutional orders. Blockchains compete and complement with firms, markets, governments, clubs, and the commons. Additionally, their versatility (the constitution can be varied for each application) allow them to adopt the characteristics of other institutions. The authors call this the ‘universal Turing institution’. The chapter then explores the dynamics of institutional and constitutional innovation in distributed ledgers.
Chris Berg, Sinclair Davidson and Jason Potts
Ledgers are a fundamental economic technology. This chapter develops the ledger-centric view of the economy. Ledgers provide an underlying infrastructure for exchange by allowing actors to prove, validate, and verify property ownership. In this sense ledgers map economic, political and social relationships. The chapter offers three analytic categories of ledgers (general, actual, and perfect), and considers the evolution of ledger technology in this context. Finally, the chapter tackles ledgers as rule sets for economic coordination, and the significance of this for interoperability.