Edited by Beatriz Carrillo, Johanna Hood and Paul Kadetz
Dorothy J. Solinger
This chapter presents an outline of the Minimum Livelihood Guarantee program (dibao), a social assistance scheme first introduced in Shanghai in 1993 and expanded to all Chinese cities by 1999. The chapter argues that the scheme has been tightly linked to the pacification of laid-off workers (primarily those from the State-owned sector). It was designed also to serve as a new form of basic sustenance for the poor following the collapse of the welfare safety net provided by the traditional urban work unit under the socialist planned economy. The chapter argues accordingly that as public demonstrations by the jobless fizzled out after the mid-2000s, the initial relative generosity of the early phase of the scheme saw declining benefits over time. The chapter uses statistical comparisons to document the increasing miserliness of the scheme: i.e., it compares dibao outlays with average disposable income of urban residents nationwide and with average wages in various cities; and it considers drops in governmental dibao investment as a percentage of gross domestic product and of government expenditure over the years. Finally, the chapter draws on interviews with recipients to convey the pitiable living conditions under which these allowances force them to survive.
This chapter explores the changing role of the State in the provision of educational opportunities, with a specific focus on geographical differences since the market reform in China. Drawing on evidence from national data on enrolment, progression rates and educational spending, it highlights widening inequality in access and participation in education between the eastern, central and western areas during the first stage of the reform (1980s–1990s), as the consequence of the Party-State’s gradual development strategy. Furthermore, from the 2000s a new initiative to improve educational provision in rural and western areas was coincident with the Party-State’s strategy of promoting social cohesion. However, the State’s selective strategy towards educational provision by prioritising funding to realise universal access to compulsory education and to support elite universities has further divided regions in opportunity structures. The chapter argues that the State’s educational provision, while consistent with its overall development objectives, allowed eastern provinces to increase their advantage in educational spending and access to higher education. The same institutional structures punished students from poor western and central provinces, who were relatively disadvantaged in their opportunities to achieve upward social mobility through higher education.