The welfare system in the United States underwent profound changes as a result of the groundbreaking welfare legislation passed in 1996 entitled The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation Act (PRWORA). The Political Economy of Welfare Reform in the United States examines in detail the legislative process that gave rise to PRWORA and presents two alternative theories to explain this process; the traditional public interest model of government and the public choice model. On the basis of a detailed historical analysis of welfare programs and policies in the US, the author explains the two alternative theories and engages in a detailed institutional and statistical analysis to make a convincing argument for the validity of the public choice paradigm.
Edited by Ram Mudambi, Pietro Maria Navarra and Giuseppe Sobbrio
The distinguished authors in this volume address the fundamental causes for such heterogeneous international experiences, placing particular emphasis on the role of institutions. They demonstrate how the study of economic development is increasingly linked to the development of institutions, which allow for more complex exchanges to occur in markets and societies. Institutions can be understood as rules or constraints that channel individuals' actions in specific directions, and can be formal or informal depending on their genesis. The book highlights the connection between institutions and economic welfare by examining countries at different stages of development. Although the authors' study material effects, they also look at individual well-being which is more strongly influenced by the non-material products of institutions such as opportunity, freedom and relationships. They move on to highlight the role of institutions in global business, in terms of innovation, entrepreneurship and foreign direct investment. In the concluding chapters they focus on the actual process of transition from one institutional framework to another. Amongst other examples, they examine reforms to international financial institutions and constitutional adjustments in transition countries.
Fiscal Choices and Economic Outcomes
William A. Niskanen
This book presents simple models of the major alternative types of political regimes, estimates of the parameters of these models, and quantitative estimates of the fiscal choices and economic outcomes of these regimes. William Niskanen provides valuable analysis of the effects of the voting rule, the progressivity of the tax structure, and the length of the fiscal horizon in democratic governments and interesting insights of the effects of alternative regimes on policies, such as war and immigration, that affect the number of people subject to the regime.
The Political Economy of Italian Electoral Reform
Ram Mudambi, Pietro Maria Navarra and Giuseppe Sobbrio
This topical book analyses the change of electoral rules in Italy from proportional representation toward plurality. While Italy is used as the illustrative case, the analysis has far-ranging theoretical and practical implications, and will therefore be of interest to academics and researchers of political economy, constitutionalism and public choice.
A Political Economy of Russia from the 10th Century to 2008
This unique book uses a transaction cost perspective to illustrate how hierarchies influenced the structure of markets and behaviour of individual businesses and cartels in pre-revolutionary, Soviet and present-day Russia.
Gordon Tullock, eminent political economist and one of the founders of public choice, offers this new and fascinating look at how governments and externalities are linked. Economists frequently justify government as dealing with externalities, defined as benefits or costs that are generated as the result of an economic activity, but that do not accrue directly to those involved in the activity. In this original work, Gordon Tullock posits that government can also create externalities. In doing so, he looks at governmental activity that internalizes such externalities.