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* Eli M. Salzberger and Stefan Voigt 1. INTRODUCTION During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe went through a peaceful transition to democracy, after half a century of communist rule. All of these countries adopted a new (or significantly amended an existing) written constitution. The vast majority of them based their new system of government on the continental model, two of whose main features are parliamentary democracy and a special constitutional court. However, there are significant differences in the specific details of their governmental structures. In this chapter, we try to determine the possible sources for the institutional differences in these regimes, which emerged in the same period of time and against a similar historical background. This is a very broad task, and obviously we will be able to address neither every possible feature that might be a viable explanatory factor for these institutional differences, nor every possible effect of such differences. The same limitation applies to the range of institutional components that will be scrutinized here. We will focus our analysis on the structure of the separation of powers and especially on the delegation of powers to domestic organizations, such as independent judiciaries and central banks, and to international bodies, such as international organizations. This chapter is part of a more general project on the delegation of powers in which we attempt to explain why politicians delegate powers and their choice between international and domestic delegation (Voigt and Salzberger, * This chapter was written...