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The Elgar Companion to Public Economics
Empirical Public Economics
Edited by Attiat F. Ott and Richard J. Cebula
Attiat Ott and Richard Cebula have recognised the need to present, in an accessible and straightforward way, the voluminous literature in the public economics arena. Advances in econometric techniques and the spillover of knowledge from other disciplines made it difficult, not only for students but also for lecturers, to accurately find the information they need.
General Reference
- Published in print:
- 26 Apr 2006
- ISBN:
- 9781843769576
- eISBN:
- 9781845424558
- Pages:
- 496
Show Summary Details
- The Elgar Companion to Public Economics Empirical Public Economics
- Copyright
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Editors
- Contributors
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction and Background
- Chapter 1: Public Finance and the Three Branch Model
- Chapter 2: The Empirics of the Three Branch Model
- Chapter 3: Wagner’s Law of Increasing Expansion of Public Activities
- Chapter 4: Wagner’s Hypothesis: New Evidence from the US Using the Bounds Testing Approach
- Chapter 5: Soft Budget Constraint and Hard Budget Constraint: Who is Bailing Out Whom and Why?
- Chapter 6: Public Good Provision by Dictatorship: A Survey
- Chapter 7: Empirical Evidence on the Optimality and Productivity of Government Services in Sub-Saharan Africa
- Chapter 8: The Supply Side of Democratic Government: A Brief Survey
- Chapter 9: Strategic Interaction Among Local Governments: A Spatial Analysis of Spillover of Public Goods
- Chapter 10: Economics of Conflict
- Chapter 11: Defense Expenditure and Economic Growth: Evidence from Cross-Country Panel Data
- Chapter 12: The Demand for Military Spending in Middle Eastern Countries and Turkey
- Chapter 13: Fiscal Policy and Direct Democracy: Institutional Design Determines Outcomes
- Chapter 14: Direct Democracy and Tiebout Exit
- Chapter 15: An Extension of the Rational Voter Model
- Chapter 16: A Preliminary Analysis of the Presidential Approval Rating
- Chapter 17: Line Item Veto: Lessons from the Literature
- Chapter 18: An Analysis of the UN Security Council Veto
- Chapter 19: The Political Theories of Deficits and Debt Accumulation
- Chapter 20: The Efficiency of Representative Democracy: A Comparative Study of Two Competing Models
- Chapter 21: What Kept the Russian Federation Intact? Testing the Internal Exit Model of Buchanan and Faith
- Chapter 22: Secession and Exit: An Analysis of Two Competing Hypotheses Constantine Alexandrakis and Robert T. Jones
- References
- Index
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- The Elgar Companion to Public Economics Empirical Public Economics
- Copyright
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Editors
- Contributors
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction and Background
- Chapter 1: Public Finance and the Three Branch Model
- Chapter 2: The Empirics of the Three Branch Model
- Chapter 3: Wagner’s Law of Increasing Expansion of Public Activities
- Chapter 4: Wagner’s Hypothesis: New Evidence from the US Using the Bounds Testing Approach
- Chapter 5: Soft Budget Constraint and Hard Budget Constraint: Who is Bailing Out Whom and Why?
- Chapter 6: Public Good Provision by Dictatorship: A Survey
- Chapter 7: Empirical Evidence on the Optimality and Productivity of Government Services in Sub-Saharan Africa
- Chapter 8: The Supply Side of Democratic Government: A Brief Survey
- Chapter 9: Strategic Interaction Among Local Governments: A Spatial Analysis of Spillover of Public Goods
- Chapter 10: Economics of Conflict
- Chapter 11: Defense Expenditure and Economic Growth: Evidence from Cross-Country Panel Data
- Chapter 12: The Demand for Military Spending in Middle Eastern Countries and Turkey
- Chapter 13: Fiscal Policy and Direct Democracy: Institutional Design Determines Outcomes
- Chapter 14: Direct Democracy and Tiebout Exit
- Chapter 15: An Extension of the Rational Voter Model
- Chapter 16: A Preliminary Analysis of the Presidential Approval Rating
- Chapter 17: Line Item Veto: Lessons from the Literature
- Chapter 18: An Analysis of the UN Security Council Veto
- Chapter 19: The Political Theories of Deficits and Debt Accumulation
- Chapter 20: The Efficiency of Representative Democracy: A Comparative Study of Two Competing Models
- Chapter 21: What Kept the Russian Federation Intact? Testing the Internal Exit Model of Buchanan and Faith
- Chapter 22: Secession and Exit: An Analysis of Two Competing Hypotheses Constantine Alexandrakis and Robert T. Jones
- References
- Index