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The Political Economy of Non-Territorial Exit

Cryptosecession

Trent J. MacDonald

Territorial political organisation forms the backbone of western liberal democracies. However, political economists are increasingly aware of how this form of government neglects the preferences of citizens, resulting in dramatic conflicts. The Political Economy of Non-Territorial Exit explores the theoretical possibility of ‘unbundling’ government functions and decentralising territorial governance.
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Trent J. MacDonald

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